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2Author’s Preface
That “crazy election” was the event that stood out the most during my senior year 
of high school in 2000-2001.  I was only seventeen years old at the time of the election, 
and therefore could not vote in it.  But even though I was not eligible to participate in the 
election, I – along with the rest of the country – was completely mesmerized as the 
post-election events unfolded.  Although I tried to keep up with everything, I soon 
became confused by all the different lawsuits and what their results meant.  After Bush 
v. Gore was revealed on December 12, I was disappointed by the result but not 
surprised – George W. Bush had been the presumptive winner, and that had not 
changed since the day after Election Day.
The finality that December 12 brought, however, did not change my sentiments: 
why didn’t my guy win?  I had read many newspaper articles that told of voter 
disenfranchisement in Palm Beach County and questionable legality of Bush votes.  
Moreover, the fact that George W. Bush’s own brother was the governor of the 
contested state never ceased to bother me.1  The 2000 election – in my view at the time 
– was illegitimate.
Four years later, the reelection of the illegitimate president was imminent and it 
was time for me to choose a topic for my thesis.  As a student of American politics, I 
was particularly interested in the role of presidents in American government.  I thought it 
would be an appropriate topic for my thesis to study the events of the 2000 election in 
depth and see if I still believed that my guy had been shafted, and also to examine how 
the 2000 election had affected Bush’s presidency, for it had seemed as if people had 
forgotten the election for most of Bush’s term.  Then I came across another election, the 
election of 1876, with remarkably similar circumstances – a president who had lost the 
popular vote, disputed states, apparent voter disenfranchisement, and resolution via the 
Supreme Court.  By studying the two elections simultaneously, I hoped to grasp the 
consequences of the infrequent but probable failure of the American electoral system 
1
 Many European scholars too questioned whether a country’s democratic process deserved to be taken 
seriously when the state officials ultimately making the decisions in a close election are the co-chair of 
one candidate’s state campaign (Katherine Harris) and the same candidate’s brother (Jeb Bush).
3and the legitimacy of the men who were eventually awarded the presidencies, 
Presidents Rutherford B. Hayes and George W. Bush.
Now I need to explain something about the sources I used.  Regarding the 
sources of the 1876 election (which was clearly less documented than the 2000 
election), I can assert that my sources were more or less objective, for all of them were 
either scholarly works or articles from reputable journals.  On the other hand, my 
sources of the election of 2000 do tend to have a liberal bias.  I did vigilantly try to 
choose objective sources, but even the most objective sources I could find were largely 
unable to shield the author’s view of the election, whether by which events he/she 
chose to include or not include, or how certain events were described.  I did, however, 
try to choose sources from both sides – some that were slightly biased for George W. 
Bush and others that were slightly biased for Al Gore.  On the whole though, my 
sources have a liberal slant for three reasons: first, the Gore side lost, and the losers 
are more likely to write books decrying their loss than the winners; second, academics 
and law professors (who are most likely to author books or write journal articles) are 
more likely to be liberal; and third, I acted  on my own biases as well. I also must point 
out that I used many articles from the New York Times.  I chose the New York Times
because it is probably the most widely read newspaper in the country and because it 
has arguably the best reputation for journalism of all the newspapers in the country.
However, by my own assessment as well as by the assessment of many of the works I 
read, the New York Times did have liberal tendencies as well – meaning that although 
the articles were accurately written, they were noticeably on the whole pro- Gore.
Finally, I want to thank my thesis advisor, Professor Marc Landy, for his guidance 
in this year-long endeavor of mine.  
Sincerely,
Kristina Pflanz
April 15, 2005
4Chapter 1: Introduction
Americans largely regard the United States’ republican system as the best in the 
world.  Although this sentiment may be the result of sheer ignorance of other political 
systems combined with the U.S.’s current status as the sole global power, one cannot 
deny that the U.S. system surpasses all other systems on account of its durability.  The 
United States established its democratic system in 1776 and only once in 1787 did it 
revise this system, and this revision was not on account of a government collapse.  The 
United States Constitution has ruled since the passage of the Constitution in 1789.  This 
makes the U.S. government the oldest in the world, with only Norway (1814) and 
Belgium (1831) as the nearest comparisons.  Furthermore, the U.S. republican 
government never collapsed in times of extreme national strife – such as the Civil War –
unlike other former world powers like France, which is currently ruled by its fifth republic.
The remarkable durability of the U.S. Constitution, however, does not mean that 
it always functions perfectly.  The Founding Fathers knew that a perfect system was 
impossible, which is why they used somewhat ambiguous phrasing in order to leave the 
possibility for interpretation and even change open.  The system of checks and 
balances as well as the judicial branch in general are both institutions created to 
mitigate the issues that the Constitution may not cover or whose coverage is vague.  
Unfortunately, there were still some issues in which the Constitution remained silent or 
did not point out which branch was the designated authority in case of a problem.
One of the first constitutional features to come under scrutiny was the method of 
electing the president. In Article II, Section 1, clauses 2-4, the Constitution covers the 
election of the president:
Clause 2: Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the 
Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal 
to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to 
which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no 
Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of 
Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an 
Elector. 
Clause 3: The Electors shall meet in their respective States, 
and vote by Ballot for two Persons, of whom one at least 
shall not be an Inhabitant of the same State with themselves. 
5And they shall make a List of all the Persons voted for, and 
of the Number of Votes for each; which List they shall sign 
and certify, and transmit sealed to the Seat of the 
Government of the United States, directed to the President 
of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the 
Presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open 
all the Certificates, and the Votes shall then be counted. The 
Person having the greatest Number of Votes shall be the 
President, if such Number be a Majority of the whole 
Number of Electors appointed; and if there be more than one 
who have such Majority, and have an equal Number of 
Votes, then the House of Representatives shall immediately 
choose by Ballot one of them for President; and if no Person 
have a Majority, then from the five highest on the List the 
said House shall in like Manner choose the President. But in 
choosing the President, the Votes shall be taken by States, 
the Representation from each State having one Vote; A 
quorum for this Purpose shall consist of a Member or 
Members from two thirds of the States, and a Majority of all 
the States shall be necessary to a Choice. In every Case, 
after the Choice of the President, the Person having the 
greatest Number of Votes of the Electors shall be the Vice 
President. But if there should remain two or more who have 
equal Votes, the Senate shall choose from them by Ballot 
the Vice President.
Clause 4: The Congress may determine the Time of 
choosing the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give 
their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout the 
United States.2
The constitutional problem became evident in the election of 1800, when both Thomas 
Jefferson and Aaron Burr received equal amounts of electoral votes.  It was common 
knowledge that Thomas Jefferson was supposed to be president and Aaron Burr vice 
president, but that would not solve the problem at hand since the Constitution specified 
that the one with the most electoral votes would be president, and the runner-up would 
be vice president.  As specified by the Constitution, the election was transferred to the 
House of Representatives – and this is where the constitutional crisis arose.  Since Burr 
and Jefferson were each a candidate for president in his own right, this created a 
loophole that allowed devious Federalist representatives (whose candidate John Adams 
2 United States Constitution, http://www.house.gov/Constitution/Constitution.html (accessed 16 April 
2005).
6had lost) to create havoc in the election by voting for Burr as president instead of 
Jefferson.  Thirty-five ballots were cast by the House, each resulting in deadlock.  
Finally, Jefferson was elected on the thirty-sixth ballot.  The result of the election of 
1800 was the Twelfth Amendment, which required distinct votes for president and vice 
president respectively.
A second presidential election glitch came in 1824, when four candidates –
Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, General Andrew Jackson, Secretary of 
Treasury William Crawford, and Speaker of the House Henry Clay – ran for president, 
which resulted in an inability by all four candidates to acquire the 131 electoral votes 
needed to win the election.  General Jackson came closest with 99 electoral votes.
Again, the election was handed to the House, which produced John Quincy Adams as 
the winner.  Although Adams was the legal winner, the result aroused animosity by 
Jackson and his supporters, since Jackson had won the plurality of both the electoral 
and popular votes and thereby felt he had a legitimate claim to the presidency.  Jackson 
charged that Adams and Henry Clay, who had placed fourth in the election and 
therefore was left out of the runoff in the House, had constructed a “corrupt bargain” by 
utilizing Clay’s influence as Speaker of the House.  Nevertheless, Adams became the 
new president.
The elections of 1800 and 1824, however, were merely constitutional glitches 
that did not produce serious crises.  Had Aaron Burr been elected in 1800 instead of 
Thomas Jefferson though, a serious crisis could have arisen.  Fortunately that did not 
happen.  The election of 1824, on the other hand, was a legally legitimate result – it is 
remembered as a constitutional glitch only because its result did not seem warranted at 
the time.  Despite the intricate issues of the two elections, both ultimately had built-in 
solutions provided by the Constitution.
Unfortunately, there have been two presidential elections in the United States’ 
225+ year history that truly yielded serious constitutional crises: the elections of 1876 
and 2000.  Both elections had the same problem to which the Constitution was silent –
a state or states whose electoral votes were disputed, and an election outcome that 
would remain unresolved until the disputed states’ electoral votes were awarded.  There 
were other similarities as well, namely: both elections were a contest between two 
7entirely new presidential candidates following a two-term incumbent; an incredibly close 
popular vote divide between the two parties, with the election’s loser as the winner of 
the popular vote; a prolonged post-election period in order to resolve the election; and a 
populace sharply divided as a result of the elections’ resolutions.  However, the 
differences in the elections were also evident: the obvious technological disparity 
between 1876 and 2000; the circumstances in which the elections were conducted – a 
mere eleven years following the Civil War versus a time of relative peace and 
prosperity; the respective roles of the media in each election; and the difference in 
perception as to which branch of government had the proper authority to settle the 
dispute – Congress or the courts.
It is these differences between the two elections that ultimately point out that 
while the elections of 1876 and 2000 were similarly controversial because of disputed 
electoral votes, the significance of the two conflicts in history is actually divergent.  The 
election of 1876, between Republican Rutherford B. Hayes and Democrat Samuel 
Tilden, was actually over the fate of Reconstruction.  The dispute in the election lay in 
the alleged morality of the Republicans, the victors of the Civil War and champions of 
civil rights for former slaves, versus the Democrats, who wanted to thwart this progress.  
Thus, the ballot-counting essentially focused on what the outcome would have been 
had the election been free and fair.  The election of 2000, between Republican George 
W. Bush and Democrat Al Gore, focused more on the inherent flaws in the U.S. 
electoral system and state law; partisan election officials and courts, and the 
discrepancy between voter intent and legality.  In the ballot-counting of this election, the 
forces of partisanship constantly clashed with legal procedures.
The purpose of this essay, then, is  to examine these two elections in detail, with 
particular emphases on the paths pursued by each candidate in the post-election period 
and the ultimate remedies to the crises.  Also crucial to each election was what was at 
stake between the two parties as well as the legitimacy issues that followed the victor in 
his presidency. This is especially important and hence worth restating – is the victor of 
a disputed election perpetually haunted throughout his term by a veil of illegitimacy 
caused by the resolution of the election?  I aim to determine the extent to which 
seemingly illegitimate presidents are actually hindered by this apparent illegitimacy.  In 
8order to complete these objectives, I begin by outlining background data – the 
circumstances of the United States at the time, the history of each candidate, and the 
campaign period.  I follow this by presenting the details of Election Night, the initial 
results, and the components that contributed to these results.  Then, I outline the history 
of the post-election phase, paying particular attention to the contention between the two 
parties in each election between what is legally authorized versus what is reasonable 
under the circumstances, given that the conduction of each election was not exactly 
“free and fair.”  Next, I demonstrate the resolutions of both elections and the public 
perception of these resolutions.  Finally, I examine the respective presidencies of the 
victors, focusing on the events and policies crucial to their legacies in order to determine 
whether the success or failure of their presidencies was caused by their apparent 
illegitimacy.
This essay is mainly a historical survey with some analysis.  I do not come to a 
formal conclusion about the results of both elections (e.g., Tilden should have won, etc).  
Although that had been my original intent, I later decided that the impacts of the two 
elections on both the citizens of the United States as well as President Hayes and 
President Bush were far more intriguing.  Moreover, as the analysis will demonstrate, 
both sides present strong cases as to who ultimately won these elections.  It is far more 
important to understand that history itself cannot change, but its impact can determine 
the future – and the 1876 and 2000 elections certainly impacted U.S. citizens at the 
time, but the long-term consequences are debatable.
9Chapter 2: The Election of 1876
The year 1876 was a special year, because it marked the one hundredth birthday 
of the United States of America.  “Centennial mania” absorbed all regions of the nation,
due to the great Centennial Exhibition held west of Philadelphia that served as a 
“physical embodiment of American virtue and American progress”3.  Indeed, the 
uncertain experiment with a republican system as a reaction to tyrannical English 
monarchy had proven to be an enduring form of government.
Yet, even as the Centennial Exhibition attracted over eight million visitors, an 
ominous sense of threat and instability pervaded the nation.  The most devastating war 
in the history of the world had concluded on American soil scarcely only a decade 
before.  The nation still remained bitterly divided along north/south lines, and 
discernable differences of culture reinforced mutual suspicion.  The two successive 
executives after Lincoln could at best be described as failures, the first resulting in 
impeachment and the second in the exposure of corruption in national politics.  The 
economy was in the midst of the severest depression it had ever experienced due to the 
Panic of 1873, and this was largely blamed on President Grant and Republicans in 
Congress.  The extreme partisanship of the Reconstruction era threatened to damage 
the democratic political system that for a hundred years now had been the foundation of 
Americans’ sense of their country’s historic purpose in the world.4 The two-party system 
designed inadvertently by Jefferson was also in trouble as a means for choosing the 
next executive, because neither party was seen as credible and acceptable – the 
Democrats were seen as the party of the South, desperate to undo the achievements of 
the Civil War and Reconstruction, while the Republicans were seen as a party full of 
corrupt politicians starving to impose northern industrialization at any cost.  Indeed, it 
appeared to be a difficult decision for any citizen of the United States to choose a 
candidate for the 1876 presidency.
The election of 1876 for president was important because the Democratic 
challenge to Republican hegemony of the presidency since 1860 was stronger than 
ever.  Whoever became the next president could potentially alter the course of 
3
 Morris 2003, 19.
4
 Polakoff 1973, 3.
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Reconstruction, and the old tensions of the Civil War that had been suppressed for so 
long were feared to be in revival.  Yet, the two candidates who eventually emerged as 
contenders for the presidency in 1876 were not themselves totally shrouded by the 
mishaps of their respective parties.  Both were perceived a s somewhat separated from 
their parties due to the comparably clean records of both candidates.  Tilden, the 
Democratic candidate and the governor of New York, was perceived as a reformist 
within the Democratic Party due to his challenge to William Marcy “Boss” Tweed, head 
of the Democrats’ notorious patronage machine, Tammany Hall.5  Rutherford B. Hayes, 
the Republican candidate and governor of Ohio, was seen as an acceptable 
compromise in an internally divided party because both his public and private lives were 
impeccably clean, which was an important trait after Grant’s scandal-weary 
administration.  Nevertheless, it was the two candidates’ similarities, rather than their 
differences, that most contributed to making the election of 1876 the longest and most 
disputed in American history.
Democratic Candidate Governor Samuel J. Tilden
The Democratic nominating convention for its presidential candidate in 1876 was 
largely a forgone conclusion, for the Democrats were almost solidly united behind their 
candidate that had the best chance of winning the election since before the Civil War: 
Samuel J. Tilden.  Tilden was the optimal candidate for the Democrats because he was 
a reformist candidate from New York, thereby eliminating several Democratic prejudices 
and instead presenting a strong candidate especially to those disgusted with the Grant 
Administration and the general laxity of the Republicans.  He was also independently 
wealthy, which was integral to both political parties in 1876 because the nation was still 
in depression, though it is notable that he never actually spent his own money on the 
campaign.  Furthermore, it was essential that Tilden was a popular figure in New York, 
the most populous state in the Union and carrying 35 electoral votes.  If the “solid 
South” were to join even just two northern states – New York and Indiana – in voting 
Democratic, then the Democrats would recapture the presidency.6  Even northern and 
5
 Morris 2003, 99.
6
 Polakoff 1973, 14-15.
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western states that had previously voted Republican had become swing states in the 
election of 1876 because of disaffection with the Republican Party.  In short, the 
Democrats had better than just a solid chance of winning this election, and they 
intended to utilize all their forces.
Samuel Tilden was elected governor of New York in 1874 after serving as New 
York’s Democratic Party Chairman since 1866.  He was noted for his incredible 
organizational skills while serving as Democratic Party Chairman by conducting 
campaigns through finding dedicated and experienced canvassers in every election 
district whose job it was to educate the voters.7  In addition to his organizational 
success with previous Democratic campaigns, he also had two important aspects of his 
personal history that were essential for the Democratic Party: he was a Unionist during 
the Civil War who remained loyal to Lincoln, and he had actively challenged the corrupt 
Democratic machinery of Tammany Hall and its leader, Boss Tweed.  Regarding the 
former, it is notable that Tilden was an anti-slavery Democrat who never switched his 
affiliation to the Republican Party in the mid-1850s when so many others were doing 
so.8  He considered slavery a “blighting presence whose spread into the new territories 
would be the greatest opprobrium of our age,” but was more concerned with preserving 
the Union than abolishing slavery, so he campaigned for Douglas in 1860.9  When 
Lincoln won and the Civil War commenced, however, he pledged support to President 
Lincoln and even consulted with him over political and financial matters relating to the 
war.10  He still remained a Democrat, though, as he disagreed with many of Lincoln’s 
decisions over how best to preserve basic American liberties; most notably, he 
disagreed with Lincoln’s suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.11  The other aspect of 
personal history, his overthrow of Boss Tweed, was a dramatic display of detective work 
and audacity that proved he was incorruptible, fearless, and intelligent.  Both aspects 
contributed to the very important image of Tilden as a reformist and loyal both to the 
Democratic Party and to the outcome of the Civil War.
7
 Polakoff 1973, 73.
8
 Morris 2003, 94.
9
 Morris 2003, 95.
10
 Morris 2003, 96.
11
 Morris 2003, 97.
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For millions of Democrats, the election of 1876 was crucial in determining the 
direction that the country would be moving in after over a decade of Reconstruction.  
Northern and southern Democrats alike complained that the federal government 
seemed less the protector of liberty than obstructer to personal freedom.12  They 
denounced the sins of “Grantism” in Washington – wasteful spending, extreme taxation, 
economic misconduct, corruption and scandal, and abuses of Reconstruction.13 On 
several main issues, however, the Democrats agreed with the Republicans: the need for 
reform in government, the need for a gold-based currency, and the need to uphold the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.  As was expected, on the subject of 
Reconstruction Tilden remained ambiguous but condemned the “systematic and 
insupportable misgovernment imposed on the states of the South.”14   Hayes’s position 
was similarly ambiguous, and this pleased no one.  However, Tilden’s position may 
have contributed to the isolation of southern Democrats who were already suspicious of 
his northern roots and pro-business background.15  The northern Republicans were 
equally suspicious of Tilden, but mostly because of the threat he posed to Republican 
domination of the presidency.  A typical Republican assessment of Tilden at this time 
was:
“Sammy is worth $3,000,000.  Everybody belonging to him is 
well off, so that he has no claims upon his fortune.  He is a 
bachelor, you know.  He will not hesitate to spend $500,000 
or if need be $1,000,000 to promote his election; and I need 
not tell you what money can effect in the eastern 
cities…Besides, it is a mistake to underrate Sammy’s own 
talents.  He is one of the most expert organizers and adroit 
schemers I ever came into contact with.”16
Republican images of corrupt tactics attributed to Tilden such as this certainly did not 
help his cause during the election dispute, however untrue.
12
 Morris 2003, 118.
13
 Morris 2003, 119.
14
 Morris 2003, 135.
15
 Morris 2003, 135.
16
 Polakoff 1973 (Comly Papers), 112-113.
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Republican Candidate Governor Rutherford B. Hayes
While the Democrats had little trouble uniting behind their candidate Samuel J. 
Tilden, the party of Abraham Lincoln was more divided than ever.  The division of the 
Republicans at their nominating convention was largely indicative of the troubles they 
were to experience later in confirming their candidate as a winner.  Coming into the 
convention held in Cincinnati in June of 1876, the frontrunner was clearly James G. 
Blaine of Maine, a powerful force as Speaker of the House of Representatives.  Yet 
Blaine’s nomination was certainly not assured, as a solid group known as the Liberal 
Republicans opposed his nomination almost immediately, as he like so many others at 
this time was shrouded with a scandal.  Three other strong candidates were Roscoe 
Conkling, senator from New York; Oliver Morton, governor of Indiana; and Benjamin 
Bristow, Secretary of the Treasury under Grant.  Each, however, was hindered as a 
candidate for president for various reasons: Conkling could challenge Tilden in the state 
of New York, but was associated with corrupt machine politics; Morton was perceived 
as too radical and in ill health; and Bristow had alienated party regulators by prosecuting 
the Whiskey Ring too strongly.17
Hayes was not initially a frontrunner; in fact, he was everyone’s second choice –
he even wrote in his diary on June 16, “If [Blaine] fails my chance as a compromise 
candidate seems to be better than that of any other candidate.”18  Hayes’s premonition 
turned out to be correct, and he was nominated on the seventh ballot essentially as a 
compromise candidate.  He guaranteed the important state of Ohio and his personal 
and political lives were impeccably clean. As a reformist, he showed an interest in 
“clean bureaucracy” like Tilden, and his previous record in addition to his Victorian 
gentleman manner and scrupulous honesty were akin to the kind of character the 
Republicans needed after the scandal-exposing Grant administration.19 President Grant 
himself endorsed Hayes as “a good selection and will make a good candidate.”20 Some 
party regulars, however, were not happy with the Republican selection; Joseph Pulitzer 
complained, “Hayes has never stolen.  Good God, has it come to this?” Henry Adams 
17
 Morris 2003, 69-71.
18
 Williams 1964, 26.
19
 Josephson 1938, 221.
20
 Morris 2003, 83.
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of the Liberal Republicans called Hayes “a third-rate nonentity, whose only 
recommendation is that he is obnoxious to no one.”21
The three-term governor of Ohio was not to be dismissed that easily – for he 
certainly was not a national party figure like Blaine, but neither was Democratic 
candidate Tilden.  Furthermore, Hayes had the proper credentials to become president 
– he had been a successful criminal defense lawyer, a Union general who had been 
wounded in battle, and a member of Congress during Reconstruction where he was 
notable for his quiet party loyalty and detailed attention to the affairs of Ohio’s war 
veterans.22  Later he won the governorship of Ohio three times, the first and last of 
which he defeated one of Ohio’s most popular Democrats.  While governor, he had 
dealt with a Democratic legislature and was successful getting the fourteenth and 
fifteenth amendments passed in Ohio, and he established what was later to become 
Ohio State University.  
When Hayes released his letter of acceptance to become the Republican 
candidate for president, his platform was largely similar to Tilden’s: commitment to civil 
service reform, commitment to resumption of specie payments, commitment to 
nonsectarian public schools, and the usual equivocal statement about the South – the 
need for Southerners to control their own affairs, but also for the respect of 
constitutional rights for all citizens.23  The inclusion of reform was especially important, 
because Hayes was able to draw back some of the Liberal Republicans who had bolted 
in 1872.  Interestingly, Hayes also promised to only serve one term so that patronage 
could not be used to secure his reelection.24  Not all Republicans embraced this 
principle though, for many thought that civil service reform could not take place in four 
years and the struggle for the presidency in 1880 could be as difficult for the 
Republicans as in 1876; furthermore, President Grant felt that Hayes was insulting his 
own two terms.25
Thus, the parties of the American system in 1876 had chosen their respective 
contenders for the presidency; two men largely similar on the issues of that year but 
21
 Morris 2003, 83.
22
 Polakoff 1973, 30.
23
 Rehnquist 2004, 82; Hoogenboom 1995, 266.
24
 Hoogenboom 1995, 266.
25
 Hoogenboom 1995, 266-267.
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representing the two sides of the ideological struggle that still remained from the Civil 
War.26
The Campaigns
True to the tradition of the day, after both Tilden and Hayes had composed their 
acceptance letters as presidential nominees, neither campaigned actively for himself 
and relied upon the party to do the necessary campaigning.  In Hayes’s camp were a 
respectable list of orators such as former nominees James G. Blaine and Benjamin 
Bristow, future presidents James A. Garfield and Benjamin Harrison, and even Mark 
Twain.27  The Republicans, who realized the very grave prospect of the northern states 
of New York and Indiana (the states of Tilden and his vice presidential candidate 
Hendricks respectively) going to the Democrats in this election, once again found it 
prudent to “wave the bloody shirt” in their campaign for Hayes.  Although Tilden had 
been a Union supporter, the Hayes campaign wanted to impress upon the electorate 
that while every Democrat had not been a rebel, every rebel had been a Democrat, 
which in essence identified the Democratic Party as the party that brought on the Civil 
War.28 One example of a “bloody shirt” speech utilized by the Republicans was:
“Every man that endeavored to tear the old flag from the 
heaven that it enriches was a Democrat.  Every man that 
tried to destroy this nation was a Democrat…The man that 
assassinated Abraham Lincoln was a Democrat…Soldiers, 
every scar you have on your heroic bodies was given to you 
by a Democrat.”29
Civil service reform, however, was eventually deemphasized because Hayes realized 
that the few reformers who would vote for Tilden because of this issue would be 
inconsequential in comparison to lethargic rank and file Republicans who would now go 
to the polls in response to the bloody shirt.30 As a complement to “the bloody shirt,” 
Republicans also charged that a Democratic victory would result in turning over the 
26
 Eckenrode 1930. 140.
27
 Eckenrode 1930, 145.
28
 Rehnquist 2004, 85; Haworth 1906, 40.
29
 Josephson 1938, 224.
30
 Hoogenboom 1995, 269.
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United States to Confederate rule and also the federal payment of countless 
Confederate claims to wartime damages.31 Even Tilden, who had done much less for 
his campaign in comparison to Hayes, felt obligated to deny these false charges.
For their part, the Democrats virtually had their campaign material handed to 
them by the Grant administration.  The number of scandals in the Grant administration 
numbered one hundred and one; moreover, the country was still deeply in depression 
from the Panic of 1873.  Speakers for Tilden denounced the excesses of Republican 
rule, and contrasted the modestly priced Buchanan administration with the costly Grant 
administration.32  In short, the Democrats promised honest and economically efficient 
government if their candidate was elected.
The campaign of 1876 was modern in the sense that it focused on individuals –
more specifically, an individual: Samuel J. Tilden.  Though Hayes had a fine record 
himself, it would not be enough to overcome the recently marred record of the 
Republicans.  Therefore, their only option was to wave the bloody shirt and to tarnish 
the Democratic candidate as much as possible.  Tilden transcended his party in the 
months before the election, while Hayes was submerged in his party.33
The Electoral Controversy
The first Tuesday in November of 1876 happened to be on November 7th of that 
year.  Nearly eight and a half million Americans went to the polls on that first Tuesday of 
November, two million more than had voted in the 1872 contest.34  Rutherford B. Hayes 
wrote in his diary that day, “A cold but dry day.  Good enough here for election work.  I 
still think Democratic chances the best – But it is not possible to form a confident 
opinion.”35
Remarkably, Hayes had once again foreshadowed what was to come in his diary 
entry – for on November 8th, Tilden appeared to have won, but even his own party 
wasn’t one hundred percent sure of this result.  Newspapers from around the country 
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offered contrasting headlines from Democratic New York Tribune’s “Ave!  Centennial 
Sam!  Complete Democratic Victory” to the Republican Chicago Tribune’s “Lost.  The 
Country Given Over to Democratic Greed and Plunder” to the Republican New York 
Times’ “A Doubtful Election.”36  Despite its appearance as the maverick, the New York 
Times’ claim of “A Doubtful Election” actually held weight – the known returns of the 
election at that point were far from complete, and the western states hadn’t yet 
submitted any.  Furthermore, the returns from three states – Florida, Louisiana, and 
South Carolina – were too close to call, so their electoral votes were given to neither 
candidate.
Nevertheless, it appeared as if Tilden had won.  He carried all the states south of 
the Mason-Dixon line, excluding the doubtful three, as well as his home state of New 
York and Hendricks’s home state of Indiana; plus neighbors Connecticut, New Jersey, 
Maryland, and Delaware, with a grand total of 184 electoral votes out of the 185 needed 
to win the presidency.37 He had also won the popular vote by over 250,000 votes, or 
51% of the ballots.  Hayes retained the Northeast, the Midwest (except Indiana), and 
the West, albeit by smaller margins than Grant had carried them in 1872.  His electoral 
count was 166.  Nineteen electoral votes were at stake among the three close states, 
however, and if Hayes carried all three then the electoral count would be Hayes winning 
the presidency with 185 electoral votes over Tilden’s 184, but if Hayes lost even one of 
these states then Tilden would be the next president.
No one who had seen the initial returns – not even Republican candidate 
Rutherford B. Hayes, who had gone to bed on November 7th thinking he had been 
defeated – thought that Hayes had won.  The controversy of the nineteen electoral 
votes began largely on account of two significant players – General Daniel E. Sickles of 
the Republican Party and John C. Reid, managing editor of the New York Times.  
General Sickles had stopped by the Republican headquarters in New York City just 
before midnight on November 7th and had asked to see the dispatches from the various 
states.  As he looked at the close returns from South Carolina, Florida, and Louisiana, 
he determined that by fair probabilities that Hayes could potentially have won all three 
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states and the presidency.  Given that these three states were the only remaining 
southern states with Republican governors, Sickles sent telegrams to the governors of 
all three states that said: “With your state sure for Hayes, he is elected.  Hold your 
state.”  For his part, John C. Reid had come largely to the same conclusions as Sickles 
on his own.  In addition to Reid’s fanatical hatred of all Democrats, he received a 
doubtful telegram from New York State Democratic Chairman Daniel E. Magone that 
read “Please give your estimate of electoral votes secured for Tilden.  Answer at 
once.”38 This alone was enough reason for Reid not to concede his paper to Tilden.
Moreover, after meeting with Sickles and the rest at the Republican Headquarters, the 
Times had changed the totals on the bulletin board outside its office to indicate that 
Hayes had won the presidency, not Tilden.39  The tides were beginning to turn, and 
even Rutherford B. Hayes privately proclaimed hope in his diary: “…It dawned on us 
that with a few Republican States in the South to which we were fairly entitled, we would 
yet be victors.”40
Within days, the major newspapers of the nation reneged on their previous 
headlines of a victory for Tilden.  Zach Chandler, the Republican Party Chairman, sent 
out a telegram that read, “Hayes has 185 electoral votes and is elected.”41  The 
Democrats were astounded, and some people called for the Democrats to arm 
themselves and march to Washington to install Tilden by force; “Tilden or Blood!” was 
their cry.42  Both candidates proceeded to act presidential and publicly remained silent 
throughout the controversy, though neither conceded defeat to the other either.  
President Grant called for “visiting statesmen” –  e.g. prominent Republicans – to go to 
the states to monitor the vote canvassing, and the Democrats did the same.  Grant also 
took steps to prepare for any armed threat to the government by amassing troops 
around the capital.43  Finally, Grant issued a statement to General William Tecumseh 
Sherman that was subsequently printed in every newspaper in the United States:
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“…Should there be any grounds of suspicion of fraudulent 
counting on either side, it should be reported and denounced 
at once.  No man worthy of the office of the President would 
be willing to hold the office if counted in, placed there by 
fraud; either party can afford to be disappointed in the result, 
but the country cannot afford to have the result tainted by the 
suspicion of illegal or false returns.”44
Controversy at the State Level
Grant’s notion of “illegal and false returns” was to paralyze the controversy into 
stalemate for many months following the election, for it was later going to be a problem 
getting the Democratic and Republican visiting statesmen to agree what constituted 
“illegal and false.”  Similarly, it would be a huge problem discerning that either candidate 
had won a “fair and free” election.
In South Carolina, Hayes appeared to have won the election by 600 to 1000 
votes, bolstered by the fact that blacks outnumbered whites in the state by a ratio of five 
to three.  The problem for the Republicans was that in addition to the presidential race, 
there was an even more bitter governor’s race in South Carolina that Democratic 
candidate Wade Hampton appeared to have won by a larger margin than 1000 votes.45
At that time in history, it was not likely that the winners for both the presidential and 
gubernatorial races would be of different parties in the same election; furthermore, 
Republican governor Daniel H. Chamberlain refused to concede that he had lost the 
race.46 It also appeared that more votes were cast in South Carolina than there were 
eligible voters – the Republican state legislature had consistently refused to enact a 
state registration law, a complaint that the Democrats had had for some time.47  In the 
Republicans’ favor, it was especially clear in the Palmetto State that Democrats had 
threatened blacks before the election – evidence of assault and arson against blacks 
emerged, as well as tactics known as “industrial proscription,” which effectively was 
Democrats announcing that they would not employ Republicans or rent land to them.48
Nevertheless, the South Carolina canvassing board was composed of five Republicans, 
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three of whom had their own bids for reelection, and the Palmetto state subsequently 
went for Hayes.  Interestingly, the canvassing board also validated the election of 
Democrat Wade Hampton, which has recently been cited as another corrupt bargain – a 
trade-off of the Republicans and Democrats giving the electors to Hayes on the 
condition of getting rid of Chamberlain.49
Louisiana’s returns elicited a big question mark.  Despite a black majority in the 
state, Tilden had a lead of anywhere from 6000 to 8900 votes in the state – a difficult 
number for Republicans to surmount.  Like South Carolina, there was evidence of 
Democratic intimidation – particularly evident by the killing of Henry Pinkston, a black –
but there was also equally sufficient evidence of Republican fraud. Louisiana state law 
required membership of both parties in its canvassing board of five members, but the 
one Democrat on the board had previously resigned and the Republicans had not made 
an effort to replace him before the presidential election.50  Moreover, Louisiana law gave 
the canvassing board absolute authority to decide which votes to count and which votes 
to throw out.51  The canvassing board allowed five observers from each side, but would 
not allow the Democrats to replace the vacant seat on the canvassing board.
If only to add to the chaos, it soon became known that the loyalty of the 
Louisiana canvassing board could be bought.  J. Madison Wells, the presiding officer, 
had allegedly told the Democrats that the board would certify the Tilden electors for 
$100,000 apiece for the two white members of the board and $25,000 apiece for the 
two blacks.52  When the Democrats refused this offer, Wells gave the same deal to the 
Republicans, who also refused.  When the canvassing board actually got to the 
business of counting votes, they ended up throwing out about fifteen thousand votes, 
thirteen thousand of which were Democratic, citing “systematic intimidation, murder, and 
violence toward one class of voters.”53  By throwing out the returns in nearly all the 
parishes that gave clear majorities for Tilden and refusing to throw out the returns in 
49
 Wallace 1942, 380.
50
 Rehnquist 2004, 107.
51
 Morris 2003, 185.
52
 Polakoff 1973, 213.
53
 Polakoff 1973, 214; Morris 2003, 191.
21
parishes in which the Republicans were shown to have committed frauds, the 
canvassing board gave Louisiana’s electors to Hayes by three to four thousand votes.54
Florida’s vote was by the narrowest of margins of the three disputed states; its 
initial return was a ninety-one vote lead for Tilden.  Like South Carolina and Louisiana, 
historians are certain that the Florida election was indeed not “fair and free,” though the 
use of outright intimidation by Democrats was milder than the cases of South Carolina 
and Louisiana.  Unlike South Carolina and Louisiana, Florida had a white majority that 
was fiercely committed to the Democratic Party.55 Florida law dictated that a voter could 
cast his ballot at any poll in the county where he lived so that blacks could vote at the 
county seats under the protection of state and federal authorities, but the unwanted 
consequence was high levels of repeat voting, especially by Republicans, and the 
detection of which was virtually impossible.56 On the Democratic end, there was liberal 
usage of Democratic ballots printed with the Republican symbol in order to trick illiterate 
voters.57 Thus, fraud on both sides was demonstrated in Florida at the highest degree.
The state canvassing board of Florida consisted of state Attorney General 
William Cocke, a Democrat, and two Republicans.  Similar to Louisiana, Florida’s 
canvassing board had discretion to discount returns that were “irregular, false, or 
fraudulent.”58 The board worked in public, and indeed exercised its option to throw out 
some returns, either unanimously or by a 2-1 vote, the two Republicans always against 
the Democrat.  In one particularly egregious episode, the board certified results from 
reliably Democratic Baker County as 130 votes for Hayes versus 89 votes for Tilden 
despite the fact that the board had in its possession another set of returns from Baker 
county that supplied contradicting information.59 Thus, Florida’s returns were certified 
for Hayes by a margin of only forty-three votes.
An unexpected dispute arose during this time in Oregon, a state that had always 
been put in Hayes’s column.  Both sides had conceded that Hayes had carried Oregon 
by more than one thousand votes, but the issue was that one of Oregon’s Republican 
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electors, John W. Watts, also held the office of postmaster – and thus was a federal 
employee – which violated the Constitutional clause that “No…person holding an Office 
of Trust or Profit under the United States shall be appointed an elector.”60 To be sure, 
Watts’s position was of the fourth class in the small town of Lafayette earning a small 
salary of $268 per year, but it was certainly in violation of the Constitution.61  Oregon 
had a Democratic governor and the Democrats saw this as a chance to retain the 
election that had been stolen from them.  Indeed, Watts resigned as postmaster a week 
after the election and the Postmaster General Tyner telegraphed Lafayette F. Grover, 
governor of Oregon, and said:
“Upon careful investigation, the legal opinion is that the votes 
cast for a Federal office-holder are void, and that the person 
receiving the next highest number of votes should receive 
the certificate of appointment…”62
The next highest vote receiver was E.A. Cronin, a Democrat, who was appointed by the 
governor to fill the vacancy.  Thus, the two Republican electors voted for Hayes while 
Cronin voted for Tilden, and the return was then forwarded to Washington with 
Governor Grover’s signature.  Grover validated his actions by claiming that because 
Watts was ineligible, there was never an incumbent and hence there was no vacancy.63
Meanwhile, the two Republican electors filled the vacancy caused by Watts’s 
resignation by appointing Watts himself, since he had resigned both his postmaster and 
elector jobs.  They subsequently cast three ballots for Hayes, which were not certified 
by the governor but by the secretary of state of Oregon.  To be sure, the Democrats 
never really thought that the return that included E.A. Cronin’s electoral vote for Tilden 
would be certified; they hoped that the Oregon situation would force an investigation of 
all the electoral returns rather than merely deciding which returns to accept.64
Congress required electors to cast their ballots in the state capitals on December 
6.  It was a routine procedure in thirty-four state capitals, but in Salem, Tallahassee, 
Columbia, and Baton Rouge, two sets of electors met and both forwarded their 
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conflicting votes to Washington, signed by various governors, governors-elect, 
secretaries of state, or no one at all.65  Thus, Tilden still had 184 electoral votes and 
Hayes still had 165.  The whole situation represented a mixed bag for the country, 
because in a truly “free and fair” election it was probable that Hayes would have won 
the election; in fact Hayes wrote in his diary,
“…If there had been neither violence nor intimidation, nor 
other improper interference with the rights of colored people, 
we should have carried enough Southern States to have 
held the country, and to have secured a decided popular 
majority in the Nation…There is no doubt that a very large 
majority of the lawful voters are Republicans.  But the 
Democrats have endeavored to defeat the will of the lawful 
voters by the perpetration of crimes whose magnitude and 
atrocity has no parallel in our history…”66
Conversely, had it not been for the odiously partisan methods of canvassing the votes 
utilized by the Republicans, Tilden would have won the election determined by ballots 
cast.  When Tilden heard about the events of December 6 from his home in New York, 
he said, “Our presidential election has been subverted by a false count of votes cast by 
the presidential electors…”67 The consensus of recent historians is that Hayes was 
probably entitled to the votes of South Carolina and Louisiana and Tilden to Florida, 
though it is impossible to speculate whether these results would have been yielded had 
the elections been free and fair.68
Constitutional Crisis
Issues had arisen in choosing a president before, notably in 1800 and 1824, but 
in these two cases the Constitution offered a timely but procedural solution.  1876 
presented a unique situation, for the Constitution was indeed silent about what to do 
when there were multiple certifications sent to Washington with conflicting results.  The 
Constitution authorized that, “The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the 
Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes shall then 
be counted; the person having the greatest number of votes for President, shall be the 
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President.”69  This Constitutional clause, like so many others, was ambiguous in its 
intentions – was it authorizing Thomas W. Ferry, the acting President of the U.S. Senate 
in 1876, to determine which results were valid?  In this case, since Ferry was a 
Republican, Hayes would clearly be the next president.  But the Constitution also could 
be construed that Ferry was just to open the returns, and in seeing that four states had 
multiple and conflicting returns he would have to declare that neither candidate had a 
majority of electoral votes and the contest would be placed in the House of 
Representatives, as dictated by the Twelfth Amendment.  Then, since Democrats 
controlled the House, Tilden would be elected – but since Republicans controlled the 
Senate, where the vice president would be chosen, Hayes’s running mate Wheeler 
would be elected with Tilden.
Another issue that did not play a major role in 1876 but has since been studied 
by historians was the clear bias of the Electoral College in 1876 in favor of the 
Republicans.  The apportionment of 1872 was not equitable in the states, and in fact in 
direct violation of a law mandating the equitable distribution of seats.70  If apportionment 
had indeed been equitable for the election of 1876, none of the controversy would have 
arisen because Tilden would have already attained 185 electoral votes even without the 
disputed states.
As it was, however unfair for either side, a serious Constitutional crisis had 
indeed arisen.  Given that the situation was beginning to aggravate tensions similar to 
those seen in 1860, it was crucial especially to the Republicans that a fair decision be 
reached.  Instead of leaving the decision up to Ferry, both the Senate and the House 
each appointed bipartisan committees to investigate the returns in each of the original 
three disputed states with each committee to submit a majority and minority report.  
Unsurprisingly, the Republican-controlled Senate majority felt that Hayes was entitled to 
all three states while the Democrat-controlled House majority felt they belonged to 
Tilden.  Partisan ties had indeed been maintained, and the stalemate resumed until 
after Christmas of 1876.
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During the month of December, Samuel J. Tilden had not remained idle.  
Although he had not actively engaged in the electoral controversy, he was certainly 
trying to promote his cause through the writing of a massive study of previous 
presidential elections titled The Presidential Counts.  The Presidential Counts was given 
to every national legislator, and its conclusion was that the President of the Senate was 
not entitled to decide which electoral votes from a contested state, and instead the
Senate and the House together had the ultimate authority to decide on this question.71
If decision could not be reached, Tilden maintained, then the election should be 
determined by the House of Representatives, as precedent of 1824 dictated.   Although 
The Presidential Counts was a noble work, it had little value in settling the controversy 
in the end.
For his part, Rutherford B. Hayes was now firmly convinced that a fair election in 
the South would have yielded a Republican victory.  He wrote in his diary, “No doubt a 
fair election would have carried [Louisiana] for the Republicans.”72 While Tilden wrote 
The Presidential Counts, Hayes participated in his own fate by courting individuals who 
might affect his chances of becoming president, notably President Grant, who had 
already let it slip that he believed that Tilden had won the election.73
In the middle of January of 1877, a solution to the crisis was finally agreed upon 
in the form of Electoral Count Bill of 1877.  The Electoral Count Bill of 1877 stipulated a 
commission composed of five members from the House (three Democrats and two 
Republicans), five members from the Senate (three Republicans and two Democrats) , 
and five members from the Supreme Court, four chosen based on geographical 
diversity and the fifth chosen by the other four.74 The decision was to be legally binding 
unless overridden by both the House and the Senate.  The commission would be evenly 
split along partisan lines, with the deciding votes clearly from the Supreme Court 
Justices.  It was understood that two justices sympathetic to the Democrats and likewise 
two justices sympathetic to the Republicans would be part of the commission, with the 
fifth slot filled by Justice David Davis, a Lincoln appointee and widely regarded as an 
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independent.  Neither Hayes nor Tilden was initially enamored with this compromise, 
but it was Congress that ultimately decided that the Electoral Count Bill would indeed be 
the deciding agent.  
A surprise came to all parties involved when Davis announce d that he would not 
serve on the commission, since he had not indicated any opposition to the bill during its 
passage.  He had run for the Senate in Illinois (as an independent) which had resulted 
in another disputed election, and the Illinois legislature had recently pronounced Davis 
the winner.75 Davis would not even consider serving on the commission – for it was a 
known fact he hadn’t even voted in the recent presidential election – and he stated that 
if he should serve on the commission, then he would consider himself necessitated to 
decline his Senate seat, which he was not inclined to do.76 Although this could be 
construed as a ploy by Davis to grant the presidency to the Republicans, there is no 
indication that his opinion on the matter was anything more than impartial.  Thus, the 
last seat on the Electoral Commission was taken by Grant-appointee and Republican 
justice Joseph P. Bradley, and it seemed all but inevitable that Rutherford B. Hayes 
would be the next president of the United States.
Indeed, the inclusion of Justice Davis on the commission was what had made the 
Electoral Count Bill palatable to both parties, and now the Democrats saw the inclusion 
of Justice Bradley instead as clear partisan bias against their candidate.  Nevertheless, 
the bill had been passed by Congress and signed by President Grant, and Bradley’s 
vote was most likely going to be the deciding one.
Because Florida came first alphabetically of the four disputed states, its returns 
were debated first by the commission.  The hearings on Florida went on for a solid week 
between February 1st and February 7th, and finally on February 7th a vote was taken.  
Bradley gave a speech before the vote, where he said:
“The two houses of Congress, in proceeding with the count, 
are bound to recognize the determination of the state board 
canvassers as the act of the state and as the most authentic 
evidence of the appointment by the state.  While they may 
go behind the governor’s certificate, if necessary, they can 
only do so for the purpose of ascertaining whether he has 
75
 Morris 2003, 218.
76
 Rehnquist 2004, 159.
27
truly certified the results to which the board arrived.  They 
cannot sit as a court of appeals on the action of that 
board.”77
Clearly, Bradley was going to vote for Hayes.  This was an obvious setback for the 
Democrats, since Florida was the state where Tilden’s claim was the most legitimate.  A
few minutes later, the vote was eight to seven in favor of Hayes – strictly along partisan 
lines.  Although evidence from the other three states still hadn’t been heard, it was clear 
from Bradley’s speech that he did not intend to vote differently for the other contests.  
Hayes was going to be the next president.
A Compromise of 1877?
The Electoral College Commission’s decision was not the end of Election of 1876 
debacle.  By late February 1876, the Democrats’ chances looked bleak.  However, the 
Democrats still held one card: they controlled the House of Representatives, and if they 
filibustered in the House then the counting would not be completed by March 4, the day 
that the new president was to be inaugurated. The threat of incomplete results by 
inauguration day was indeed grave – for in the failure to elect a president, the line of 
succession would be the president of the Senate, the Speaker of the House, and the 
Secretary of State.78 No one wanted to think about what kind of calamity would ensue if 
neither Hayes nor Tilden were elected.  Nevertheless, the filibuster never occurred –
Speaker of the House Samuel J. Randall denied all motions to recess, reconsider, and 
call roll, and the southern Democrats would have defeated it anyway.  The count was 
completed in the early hours of March 2, 1877 – a little over 48 hours before 
inauguration day.
American history books speak of a “Compromise of 1877” that took place among 
national politicians in response to the proposed filibuster by some Democrats.  The 
Compromise of 1877 is usually simplified as a trade- off between the Republicans and 
the Democrats: Hayes to be inaugurated as president in return for the end of 
Reconstruction.  As is the usual case with simplifications, the trade-off version omits 
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practically all of the contention among historians over the last century concerning the 
Compromise, for historians have not yet reached universal consensus over the matter.  
The first version of the Compromise is somewhat similar to that of the 
simplification: it involves a meeting between Republican cronies and southern 
Democrats in a smoke-filled room at Wormley’s Hotel in Washington, D,C., in which the 
Republicans agree to abandon the two remaining Republican state governments in the 
South (resolving the gubernatorial disputes in South Carolina and Louisiana) in return 
for the southerners’ promise to defeat the Democratic filibuster, allowance of completion 
of the count, and the peaceful inauguration of Hayes.79  Essentially, the southern 
Democrats were abandoning Tilden in exchange for control over two states, and the 
Republicans were abandoning the cause of the Negro in exchange for the presidency.80
It is essential that one take this version of the Compromise in the context associated 
with it – this version portrays the country as practically being on the brink of another civil 
war, and the Compromise as the preventative solution to the tensions.
In 1951, C. Vann Woodward’s Reunion and Reaction essentially revised this 
theory and redefined the natures of both parties.  In his revision, Vann Woodward 
deems the events at the Wormley Hotel as an insignificant formality in comparison to 
the larger and mainly economic compromise that took place between Republicans and 
Whiggish southern Democrats.  Vann Woodward theorized that many northern 
Republicans identified the “Whiggishness” of the emerging pro-business and pro-
industry southern Democrats; that this sector in its ideology was essentially 
conservative and federalist but aligned with the Democrats over the white supremacy 
issue. These two groups, united primarily by economic interest, struck a bargain: 
withdrawal of the remaining carpetbag regimes, all of which were located in the three 
disputed states; the assurance of federal subsidies to aid Southern rehabilitation; the
appointment of Democrats to patronage positions in the South; a promise of financial 
aid in the construction of the Texas and Pacific Railroad; the appointment of a Democrat 
to the President’s cabinet; and finally, tacit admission that the South alone should 
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resolve its racial problem.81  Vann Woodward focuses much of his theory on the railroad 
interests; as the bargain was definitely not incidentally beneficial to the pro-industry 
Southerners and railroad promoters.
Vann Woodward also recognized that the bargain between the Northern 
Republicans and southern Democrats was a calculated effort to divide the Democratic 
Party – attempted even in the long term.  Although the bargain did gain Hayes the 
presidency, the southern Democrats realigned solidly with their party in Congress 
following the election and the long-term hopes of party redefinition were dashed.  
Throughout his book, Vann Woodward emphasized the secrecy of these negotiations 
and that the results were primarily in the economic interests of the constituents involved 
as opposed to the seemingly race-driven motives on behalf of the southerners as in the 
traditional theory.  Thus, Vann Woodward concludes that there was indeed a 
Compromise of 1877, but that it was fundamentally different than the traditional theory.
Vann Woodward’s theory was widely accepted among fellow historians and 
history books since 1951 have tended to depict a version of the Compromise of 1877 as 
a simplification of Reunion and Reaction, but still other theories have emerged 
regarding the Compromise.  One of these theories, offered by Allan Peskin, is that there 
was no compromise at all; for a deal whose major terms are never carried out is actually 
no deal at all.82  His evidence relies on Hayes’ initial reluctance to remove the troops 
from the disputed states until the South had achieved “wise, honest, and peaceful local 
self-government.”83  His eventual removal of the troops was in accordance with both 
northern and southern public opinion that did not wish to sustain military occupation, as 
well as evidence that the troops in the South had become counterproductive.84
Furthermore, Peskin argues, Hayes had indicated that he would govern according the 
reform wing of the Republican Party, and patronage would be dispersed as he saw fit.  
Finally, the Texas and Pacific railroad was never built through the area of the South the 
so-called Compromise had discussed.
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According to Peskin, Democrats knew they were defeated after the Electoral 
Commission returned Hayes as the winner and they merely were trying to get as much 
as they could from their bargaining position.  The Democrats observed that their outlets 
of hope were virtually used up – they couldn’t appeal to the Constitution because the 
president of the Senate, who had the constitutional function of counting the presidential 
votes, was a Republican.85  They couldn’t appeal to the Supreme Court, which was 
dominated by Republicans, and they couldn’t use force either with President Grant in 
office.  They realized that the use of force would only affirm the Republicans’ cry of the 
bloody shirt for an even more prolonged period of time.  Thus, with the choice no longer 
between two candidates but between Hayes and chaos, they chose Hayes and the 
negotiation for southern home rule.86
Bargain or no bargain, the Compromise of 1877 remains in U.S. history books as 
one of the great compromises of the Gilded Age.  Both the Election of 1876 and the 
Compromise of 1877 provided significant evidence of what and how much was at stake 
for both parties at this point in history – and Hayes’s success and failures in his 
presidential term indicate the importance of character under the mask of illegitimacy.
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Chapter 3: The Presidency of Rutherford B. Hayes
Rutherford B. Hayes was not granted the traditional honeymoon period after 
being sworn into office.  His illegitimacy was immediately propounded by the nation’s 
newspapers, each vying to give the new president the catchiest name: “His 
Fraudulency,” “Rutherfraud,” “Old Eight to Seven,” and “Returning Board Hayes” were 
among the most successful.87  Given his already-tarnished image upon entering the 
White House, it is surprising to learn that he was a relatively popular president when he 
left office in 1881.  This is not totally unexplainable; for there were no significant national 
crises while Hayes was in office, and his reformist attitude and honest demeanor lent to 
the restoration of prestige to the presidency after the scandals of the Grant 
administration.  Furthermore, what much of the nation perceived as fraud in 1876 was 
undermined in 1880 when the Republican James A. Garfield won the presidency when 
blacks were most definitely disenfranchised in the South.
Hayes’s first acts as president were directly relevant to the Compromise of 1877 
– his executive appointments.  Hayes was subject to the Tenure of Office Act and its 
consequence of a powerful Congress, though he showed presidential resolve right away 
when he refused to let powerful members of his party dictate his appointments.  
Keeping with his campaign promise but to the annoyance of Republican Stalwarts like 
Roscoe Conkling, Hayes nominated mostly reformists to his Cabinet.  Many of his 
appointments were people who had helped him win the election – such as that of 
Attorney General Charles Devins, whose law partner had served on the Electoral 
Commission.  It is also significant to notice that Hayes’s passed over all of his 
opponents at the Republican nominating convention for any positions in his Cabinet.
The most controversial of Hayes’s appointments was that of Tennessee senator and 
Democrat David M. Key as postmaster general, which Woodward later claimed to be 
fulfillment of the Compromise of 1877.
Hayes’s other important initial act as president was to construct a policy towards 
the South.  In his inaugural address he stated, “The people of those States are still 
impoverished, and the inestimable blessing of wise, honest, and peaceful local self-
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government is not fully enjoyed…But it must not be forgotten that only a local 
government which recognizes and maintains inviolate the rights of all is a true self-
government.”88  In principle, Hayes was not ready to remove the troops from the South.  
Consistent with his character, Hayes was genuinely sympathetic to the plight of the 
southern blacks and worried that they would not be able to exercise their constitutional 
rights under Democratic control.  Unfortunately, there were stronger arguments for the 
removal than for sustaining the troops.
Contrary to the simplified theory of the Compromise of 1877, the end of 
Reconstruction did not occur under Hayes alone.  Most of the end had come during the 
Grant administration, and only the carpetbag regimes of Louisiana and South Carolina 
remained by 1877.  The problem for Hayes was that by removing the two Republican 
governors he was in effect undermining his own legitimacy, for the same canvassing 
boards that had declared him victorious also declared the two Republican governors 
victorious.  On the other hand, restoring the authority of these Republican governors 
would require more troops in Louisiana and South Carolina – a plan that was not 
feasible due to hostile public opinion to a replenished military presence from both the 
North and South as well as the mere fact that the Democrats controlled the House of 
Representatives and already refused to appropriate funds to the military presence 
already there. 89 Furthermore, the troops in Louisiana and South Carolina had already 
become counterproductive and only served to further deepen the political divide 
between the races; harmony between the races would be impossible as long as the 
troops stayed.  The removal of the troops during Hayes’s administration was inevitable, 
and to remove them later rather than sooner would only result in a hostile House of 
Representatives.  Hayes removed the troops and forced the two Republican governors 
to abdicate their offices before the ides of April 1877.  This move was harshly criticized 
by many, but Hayes’s decision was popularly supported overall by both northerners and 
southerners.
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Having successfully implemented his Southern policy, Hayes wrote in his diary 
on April 22, 1877, “Now for civil service reform.”90 Hayes’s battle for civil service reform 
would ultimately prove to be just as much about curbing Congress’s power as it was 
about civil service reform.  Hayes himself preferred radical reform requiring contestants 
to take competitive examinations without regard to party, claiming “He serves his party 
best who serves his country best,”91 but this would disrupt his party’s firmly-rooted 
patronage system that had been in place since Jackson’s presidency.  Understanding 
that radical reform would be no reform at all since it would not pass in Congress, he 
took the moderate road by appointing a commission to investigate the New York, 
Philadelphia, San Francisco, and New Orleans custom houses.  When it became clear 
that Hayes’s old rival New York senator Roscoe Conkling did not intend to implement 
the reforms recommended by Hayes’s commission, Hayes dismissed collector Chester 
A. Arthur.  This, of course, enraged Conkling, and Hayes’s relations with the Old Guard 
of the Republican Party deteriorated significantly.  Hayes committed himself to battle 
when he announced an executive order that forbade federal employees from taking an 
active role in politics. Hayes’s place in history commands general admiration for 
attempting to address civil service reform, though his actions at the time provoked much 
contempt and alienation between the president and his party.  Actual legislation was not 
passed until 1883 after the assassination of Hayes’s successor Grover Cleveland.
The most serious domestic crisis that emerged during Hayes’s term was after 
only less than six months of office during the summer of 1877.  The Great Strike, as it 
was called, was the United States’ first national strike; it was precipitated by 
management of the railroad companies who faced growing pressures to cut costs due 
to sustained depression in the nation’s economy and solved this problem by cutting
wages by ten percent.  Rioting, looting, burning, and bloodshed spread in urban centers 
across the country such as Baltimore, Pittsburgh and St. Louis.  Hayes was initially not 
inclined to intervene because he believed that the strikes were a matter of state 
authority and not of federal authority until requested by the states.92  Hayes did 
eventually call federal troops, but placed them under the control of state authorities.  
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These troops were ordered to neither provoke nor suppress the rioters, which allowed 
Hayes to truthfully claim that he was not taking the side of the railroads.93  Furthermore, 
Hayes was careful not to halt the operation of the railroads, which allowed him to avoid 
any disagreements over the Constitutional powers of the president.94
Though Hayes still faced the usual allegations of illegitimacy during the Great 
Strike especially by the media, his moderate solution to the crisis was generally 
applauded by all Americans.  The public tended to blame management for the 
conditions that led to the Great Strike.95  Hayes was clearly no Ulysses S. Grant, who 
would have put the strikes down with a heavy hand, but Hayes did recognize the limits 
of toleration of his party and offered nothing further to labor other than sympathy.
Besides Civil Service Reform, Hayes had another battle with Congress during his 
presidency: the currency question.  The country still suffered from depression due to the 
Panic of 1873, and the controversial Resumption Act, which demanded that greenbacks 
be redeemed in gold in order to reduce interest payments and the federal debt, was to 
be enforced on January 1, 1879.  Hayes supported the Resumption Act because he 
believed the return to the gold standard was fiscally necessary to discourage inflation; 
however, many others, notably the Democrats, did not.96  The currency issue eventually 
took the shape of a bill in the House of Representatives called the Bland-Allison Act, 
which called for the limited coinage of silver.  The Bland-Allison Act was passed by 
Congress in February of 1878 and enacted into law over Hayes’s veto.  Surprisingly, the 
currency issue was not embedded along party lines – it was more of a regional issue 
with Hayes’s support coming mainly from the Northeast, even from his old foe Conkling.
Nevertheless, even though Hayes suffered a minor political setback in the currency 
issue, he was ultimately able to compromise with his opposition by convincing them not 
to repeal the Resumption Act.
Hayes battle Congress about foreign policy in 1879 with the passage of the 
Chinese Exclusion Bill, which restricted immigration of the Chinese.  Similar to the 
treatment of blacks in the South, the anti-Chinese sentiment in the West was primarily 
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due to racism; although this racism was ameliorated by factory owner preference of 
cheap Chinese labor over whites.97  Hayes vetoed the Chinese Exclusion Bill on March 
1, 1879, citing that its passage would be detrimental to relations with China and would 
also denounce the U.S.’s current treaty with China regarding immigration.  Although he 
did not include it in his veto message, Hayes recognized the outright racism of the 
Chinese Exclusion Bill and felt that the bill violated the equal rights principle in the 
Declaration of Independence.  He observed, “Our experience in dealing with the weaker 
races – the negroes and Indians for example is not encouraging.  We shall oppress the 
Chinamen, and their presence will make hoodlums or vagabonds of their oppressors.”98
Congress could not override Hayes’s veto because its session expired.
Hayes’s veto did not cause much controversy except in the western areas where 
anti-Chinese sentiment was greatest.  Hayes wrote in his diary, “The Veto of the anti 
Chinese bill is generally approved east of the Rocky Mountains, and bitterly denounced 
west of the mountains.  I was burned in effigy in one town!”99  Unfortunately, Hayes’s 
veto did not close the Chinese question forever – in 1881, Congress passed a ten-year 
suspension of Chinese immigration to the United States.
Hayes became a hero for his party in 1879 when Democrats attempted to take 
advantage of their position as the majority party in both houses by repealing the election 
laws, which made hindering voters a federal offense.  This action would have enabled
Democrats to achieve the presidency in 1880.  Their first method was first to pass an 
army appropriations bill with a rider that would prevent federal military and civil 
authorities from keeping peace at the polls.100  After Hayes vetoed this rider, they 
passed a bill without a rider that would prohibit federal troops from keeping peace at the 
polls unless requested to do so by the state.101  Hayes vetoed this bill too, and neither 
time were the Democrats able to override the vetoes.  Remarkably, it was these tricks of 
the Democrats that caused the Republicans to unite and rally behind their president –
Hayes had never been so popular within the party, and the party itself strengthened 
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because of it.  It was perfect timing, too, because the 1880 campaign was just months 
away.
Conclusions
A politically astute person might come to the conclusion that Hayes’s seemingly 
illegitimate election was the reason he was a one-term president.  This, of course, was 
not the case – Hayes was in fact a one-term president because he had pledged during 
his campaign to be only a one-term president.  As were the circumstances in 1880, 
Hayes may have easily abandoned his pledge and the outlook was that he would win.  
Nevertheless, Hayes never ran in 1880 and therefore couldn’t win; but there is no 
evidence to show that Hayes’s purported illegitimacy impacted in any way, positive or 
negative, the chances of his successor candidate in the 1880 election.
The media had cried “Fraud!” and Hayes had lost the popular vote, yet as Hayes 
left office in 1881 there was no rejoicing the end of an unpopular president.  Rutherford 
B. Hayes, perceived as legitimate or not, was neither beloved nor vehemently deplored.  
His presidency was not great, but nor was its legacy considered poor.  The reason that 
Rutherford B. Hayes’s presidency surpassed its initial expectations was a combination 
of three things: a relatively peaceful four years, a policy of moderation, and traditional 
Hayes luck.  Had the Republicans won the disputed election of 1876 with an Old Guard 
candidate who did not take the moderate path that Hayes took, at least three aspects of 
history could have been remarkably different: the 1880 campaign would have been 
especially bitter on both sides, with a probable Democrat victory; the prestige of the 
presidency would not have been improved; and the illegitimacy of the president would 
have been ingrained in history, unlike Hayes’s own redemption through a moderately 
successful presidency and his moral and procedural executive manner.
It is impossible for historians to know who actually won the election of 1876.  In 
the three disputed states that the Democrats cried “Fraud!” the Republicans could 
equally cry “Foul!”102  Yet, it is not implausible to assert that it truly did not matter who 
won the election of 1876, for the policies would have been nearly the same anyway.  
Hayes removed the troops, but so would have Tilden.  Hayes advocated reform in 
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government, so too would have Tilden.  Hayes supported hard money, and so did 
Tilden.  It was indeed lucky for the American people that the most disputed election in 
U.S. history was between two reform-minded, upright candidates – for it resulted in a 
relatively peaceful, stable four years that most of the population didn’t even remember 
from history class in the year 2000 when another disputed election occurred.
38
Chapter 3: The Election of 2000
On November 8, 2000, the forty-second president of the United States, Bill 
Clinton, declared to the American public, “The American people have spoken.  It’s too 
bad it is going to take a little while to determine what it was they had to say.”103  His 
reference was of course to the remarkable events that had taken place the day before –
a virtual tie between the presidential candidates Vice President Al Gore and Texas 
Governor George W. Bush, and the result of the election still to be determined by who 
won the state of Florida.
In comparison to 1876, the stakes of the 2000 election were not all that high.  
Despite all the media frenzy of the coming of the new millennium (or the final year of the 
old one), the year 2000 proved to be a mere continuation of the 1990s – a time of 
relative peace and prosperity.  Furthermore, the final two presidential candidates of 
2000 – Vice President Gore and Governor Bush – did not provoke all that much 
enthusiasm from the American public, as both were regarded as centrist candidates 
who would in general continue the status quo. One commentator wrote:
“Both chief contending parties relied on focus groups and 
polls for their ‘issues’ and ‘messages’ and chose less than 
inspiring themes and foci for their campaigns.  Both were 
financed by big corporations and represented only slightly 
different corporate agendas, and neither presented uplifting 
visions of social progress, justice, or democratic social 
transformation.”104
It seemed as if the American public’s interest in national politics was at an all-time low; 
after all, only 49.0% of eligible voters had voted in the presidential race of 1996, the 
second-lowest participation of the twentieth century (the lowest was in 1924).  The only 
factor that seemed capable of increasing this number was the fact that the election of 
2000 was a race that did not feature an incumbent – though it seemed as if it did, since 
Al Gore was Clinton’s vice president and an integral part of the administration.
Nevertheless, the final election of the twentieth century was to go down in history 
books as one of the most controversial elections of U.S. history, notorious not for any 
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ideological differences between the candidates but for its spectacular thirty-six day 
stalemate after November 7th and its result that was ultimately determined by the United 
States Supreme Court.  It would change the way that both U.S. citizens and the 
international community would view United States democratic institutions that had been 
in place for over two hundred years – and it would teach people that every vote does 
indeed count.  And though not much seemed to be at stake during the campaign in 
2000, U.S. citizens would realize less than a year later that the victor of the 2000 
election (ultimately George W. Bush) would be the leader of a new era in U.S. politics –
the post-September 11, 2001 era.
Democratic Candidate Vice President Al Gore
Albert Arnold Gore Jr. was the de facto candidate for the Democratic Party in 
2000, following the twentieth century trend of vice presidents running for president.  He 
had begun his efforts towards seeking the nomination in 1999, but unfortunately the 
impeachment trial of Bill Clinton overshadowed his aspirations at this time.105 The 
outlook was good for Gore – President Clinton’s eight- year tenure had been stable, 
peaceful, and prospering, marred only by Clinton’s sex scandal.  Indeed, a continuation 
of the status quo seemed to be what American citizens wanted in 2000 – what many 
analysts contended to be “a continuation of Clinton’s policies, without Bill Clinton.”106  It 
was Gore’s task to delicately remove himself from Bill Clinton’s moral problems, yet take 
credit for Clinton’s policies – early projections asserted that a win was all but 
guaranteed if Gore accomplished this balancing act.
Though his nomination was all but ensured, Al Gore was not about to get off 
easily during the primary season.  He was challenged by New Jersey Senator and 
National Basketball Association Hall of Famer Bill Bradley, who emphasized a liberal 
program, (“The economy soars, but some of us are left behind”) as well as a promise for 
“a new kind of leadership that puts people front and center –  not the president.”107
Bradley, like Gore, was regarded as a political centrist, but in his efforts to capture the 
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nomination he attempted to shift leftward and appeal to the more liberal wing of the 
Democratic Party.  Unfortunately for Bradley, Gore had accumulated a large amount of 
money as well as many endorsements early in the campaign, and of course had the 
huge advantage as being a key member of the incumbent’s successful administration.
Furthermore, Bradley had the extremely difficult task of attracting and building a new 
constituency within the Democratic Party that was not tied to the Clinton administration, 
which produced a constituency made up of those tied to organized interests as well as 
many independents.108  Given the magnitude of these disadvantages, it is surprising to 
note that Bradley lost to Gore in the first primary, New Hampshire, by only four points.  
This close loss, however, turned out to be the zenith of Bradley’s campaign – he was 
handily defeated in the next two primaries, Delaware and Washington, as well as all the 
primaries on Super Tuesday.  He finally withdrew from the race on March 9, 2000, two 
days after Super Tuesday.
Vice President Gore had excellent credentials to become the forty-third president 
of the United States.  Born to a veteran Tennessee senator Al Gore Sr., Al Jr. became 
used to shuttling back and forth between Tennessee and Washington, D.C. as he grew 
up.  He attended Harvard University and graduated with a BA in government in 1969, 
and later attended Vanderbilt Divinity School and Vanderbilt Law School, though he did 
not receive a degree at either.  Although he was opposed to the Vietnam War, civic duty 
compelled him to enlist in the army after he graduated from Harvard in 1969.  He served 
in the army for two years, although he was only in Vietnam briefly in 1971 as a military 
journalist.  In 1976, he quit law school to run for Tennessee’s Fourth District in the U.S. 
House of Representatives.  He defeated Stanley Rodgers in the Democratic primary, 
then ran unopposed and was elected to the House.  He was elected to the House three 
subsequent times, and served through 1984 when he ran for the Senate and won.  He 
was Tennessee’s Senator until 1992, when he was elected Vice President.  He 
attempted a presidential bid in 1988, but was defeated in the primaries by Michael 
Dukakis.  Tragedy struck in 1989 when his young son was killed in a car accident, which 
caused Gore’s decision not to attempt another bid at the presidency in 1992.
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Gore’s election to the vice presidency in 1992 marked a shift from the 
traditionally less-significant “balancing the ticket” role of vice presidents in national 
politics to a more influential “team player” that has become evident in the Clinton/Gore 
and Bush/Cheney administrations.  Gore was certainly an active player in the Clinton
administration; he was a strong advocate for the environmental movement and helped 
make up for Clinton’s lack of foreign policy experience, since Gore had served in 
Vietnam.  His major accomplishments included helping Clinton downsize the 
bureaucracy of the federal government, his role in the passage of the North African Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), a program calling for all schools and libraries to be wired to 
the internet, and his role in foreign policy involving Yugoslavia.109
After securing the Democratic nomination, Gore’s next task was to unveil his 
strategy on how he was going to beat Governor Bush on the issues of the day.  At the 
2000 Democratic National Convention in Los Angeles, Gore had revealed that he was 
going to “be his own man” – clearly an attempt to separate himself from Clinton, both 
from the Clinton scandals as well as to demonstrate his own capabilities.  In addition, he 
spoke about his vision of “a better America,” in which he would be a fighter on behalf of 
the people against the powerful, and of his intentions to extend Medicare to pay for 
prescription drugs, to work towards universal health care, to lower crime, and to 
downsize the military and make it more efficient.110 A notable break with Clinton evident 
in his convention speech was his “populist” theme, which many feared would be a return 
to the era of big government.  He chose Senator Joseph Lieberman of Connecticut as 
his running mate, which proved to be a somewhat dramatic choice since Lieberman was 
Jewish.  However, his choice of Senator Lieberman indicated his firm commitment to 
the integrity of his campaign since Lieberman had a reputation as a strong moral leader 
and had been one of only a few Democrats to seriously reprimand Clinton during his 
impeachment trial.111
On the campaign trail, the major issues that arose were the economy (the current 
prosperity, tax cuts, and the fate of social security), and education.  He wanted to 
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showcase that the economy under the Democrats had improved greatly, and what was 
once a large budgetary deficit was now a surplus.  Furthermore, social security needed 
to remain intact and protected.  He also attacked Bush’s tax cut plan, of which he 
deemed only benefited the super-wealthy.  Instead, he promoted his own moderate tax 
cuts for the middle class.  As for education, Gore supported strengthening public 
schools through a rigorous hierarchy of accountability: the states, the schools, the 
teachers, and the students.  Moreover, he promoted extended testing in order to identify 
successful and failing schools, and to reward the successful ones and help the failing 
ones.  Other issues of importance were of the traditional Democrat/Republican divide, 
including abortion, gay rights, gun control, the environment, and the size of the military.
Republican Candidate Governor George W. Bush
While the Democratic candidate of the year 2000 was largely a forgone 
conclusion, the battle for the Republican nomination was far more exciting.  The 
Republicans had not held the nation’s highest office in eight years, and they faced the 
task of constructing an appealing political ideology as well as finding a solid candidate.  
Governor George W. Bush, oldest son of forty-second president George H.W. Bush, 
was the early favorite, but in order to gain the nomination he had to overcome his five 
opponents.  His five opponents were: Senator John McCain of Arizona, Steve Forbes (a 
wealthy publisher), Alan Keyes (former deputy secretary of state), Gary Bauer (former 
domestic policy advisor to Reagan), and Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah. Nevertheless, 
Governor Bush held the cards: he had a recognizable family name, he was governor of 
a large state with many electoral votes (Forbes, Keyes, and Bauer lacked elected office 
experience), he had compiled a huge amount of campaign money from extensive 
fundraising, and he had received by far the most endorsements – thirty-six out of fifty-
five Republican senators in addition to the endorsement of the thirty-one member 
Republican Governors Association.112  The only area in which George W. Bush lacked 
was the media’s obvious bias towards Senator John McCain, who had worked hard to 
cultivate its support, though the media did recognize Bush as the front-runner.113
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Since Bush was the front-runner, strategy dictated that his five challengers attack 
him.  All but John McCain attacked Bush from the right, which made Bush look centrist 
and certainly helped him later in the campaign.114  The fact remained that only Bush, 
Hatch, and McCain of the six were plausible nominees, for the Republicans were not 
likely to waste the opportunity of a race without an incumbent on a candidate who had 
never even held elected office.  Hatch too did not have much of a chance because he 
was not fully trusted by most conservatives for the following reasons: his close 
relationship with Massachusetts Senator Ted Kennedy, his approval of Clinton’s liberal 
judicial appointments, and his Mormon beliefs, which bothered many on the Christian 
right.115  All that remained were Senator McCain and Governor Bush.
Although lacking in endorsements and campaign funds in comparison to Bush, 
Senator McCain posed a real threat to the governor.  He was a staunch conservative on 
military and social issues, yet more liberal on fiscal issues – overall, a more moderate 
candidate than Bush.  He had eighteen years of experience in Congress – Bush only 
had five years of experience as governor – and his life story, particularly his five years 
as a prisoner of war in Vietnam, could not be matched.  He had garnered the media’s 
affectionate label as a “maverick,” and his aggressive position on campaign finance 
reform and attacks on Bush’s tax cuts as fiscal recklessness made him a viable 
alternative candidate.  Upon taking on an incumbent and twelve years of Republican 
primacy, Bill Clinton had moved to the right of traditional Democrats; could the 
appropriate strategy for Republicans in the year 2000 be to choose a very centrist 
Republican who may be able to capture a sizeable chunk of Gore’s votes?  McCain’s 
performance during the primaries would test this theory.
Unfortunately for McCain, his simultaneous liberal and conservative appeal did 
not suit the traditional Republican base.  The February primaries were deceiving 
because they allowed both Democrats and Republicans to vote in them, and it seemed 
as if there was going to be a tight race.  Bush won the Iowa caucus, and McCain 
retaliated with a big victory in New Hampshire, 49% to 31%.  Then Bush won in South 
Carolina, but McCain won in both Michigan and Arizona.  The final February primaries,
114
 Ceaser and Busch 2001, 71.
115
 Ceaser and Busch 2001, 64.
44
North Dakota (the only closed primary of February), Virginia, and Washington, proved 
almost divisive for Bush’s lead as he won all three.  After some anti-Christian 
conservative outbursts, McCain was bulldozed on Super Tuesday when he lost every 
primary (all closed).  Though he had done quite well with independents and Democrats, 
McCain had failed to win the Republican vote and could therefore not capture the 
nomination.  He withdrew from the race on March 9.  Thus, Bush stood as the final 
candidate out of the frenzied pool of Republicans.
Although George W. Bush did not have quite an impressive list of credentials as 
Gore, his credentials were indeed strong enough.  Moreover, he had the advantage of 
being a new and fresh candidate who had not been tainted by the institutionalism of 
national politics.  His family had long been connected with the Republican icon, Ronald 
Reagan, and claims to being the heir of Reagan seemed more authentic coming from 
him than anyone else.  His achievements, for the most part, matched Al Gore’s – an Ivy 
League education at Yale, a stint in the Texas National Guard during the Vietnam War, 
and a Masters of Business Administration from Harvard.  At this point, Al Gore entered 
Congress while George W. Bush tried his hand at becoming a businessman and was 
moderately successful, overcoming an insider-trading scandal and becoming managing 
partner of the Texas Rangers.
In 1994, Bush defeated incumbent Democrat Ann Richards for the Texas 
governorship, and was reelected in a landslide in 1998.  As governor, he was noted for 
his success at working with constituencies of both parties.  His harsh stance on crime, 
drugs, and the death penalty, along with large tax cuts and welfare reform with sterner 
work requirements, endeared him to conservatives; while his state spending especially 
on education and bilingual programs satisfied Democrats.116  Bush’s accomplishments 
in Texas persuaded many Republicans that he could unite them and win the 
presidency.117
As candidate for president essentially in opposition to an incumbent 
administration, George W. Bush was compelled to create a platform of mostly new 
initiatives in order to attract voters.  His overarching theme was “compassionate 
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conservatism,” or the aim for a society that allows people to help themselves rather than 
rely on government for their needs.118  He deemed himself a “new kind of Republican” 
to put symbolic distance between himself and Congressional Republicans, who were 
identified significantly with a negative “less government” approach.119 He challenged Al 
Gore by identifying his ties to Clinton, and implied Gore and Clinton both shared the 
same character problems.  His strategy was to challenge traditional Democratic issues 
in order to neutralize Gore’s campaign.120  Some of the issues of his platform were: 
allowing religious charities to compete on an equal basis for participation in federally 
funded programs, a large tax cut, promoting the use of vouchers for private schools, 
supporting oil drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, maintaining a balanced 
federal budget, and restructuring the military.  
Bush chose veteran politician and former Congressman Dick Cheney as his 
running mate.  Like Gore’s choice of Lieberman, the choice of Cheney would not help 
Bush pick up any electoral votes he otherwise wouldn’t have had, for Cheney was from 
Wyoming which was safely in Bush’s electoral column.  Cheney was former White 
House Chief of Staff and former Secretary of Defense, and certainly made up for the 
experience in foreign and domestic policy that Bush lacked.121  Moreover, Cheney was 
simultaneously associated with both the moderate and right Republican wings.  Bush’s 
choice of Cheney demonstrated that Bush was looking past politics of the election to the 
job of governing, which reassured many Americans.122
The Campaign
Since almost a century and a quarter had passed since 1876, the presidential 
campaign had evolved into an entirely new being.  Party conventions were now of less 
relevance, since the candidates had essentially been chosen during the primaries.  The 
modern campaign, as fought in 2000, consisted of three main elements: the party 
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conventions, the debates, and on-the- road campaigning in the summer and fall and 
portrayal by the media.
The Republican and Democratic conventions of 2000 were held in Philadelphia 
and Los Angeles respectively.  Whereas the initial purpose for conventions had been to 
choose a candidate and platform, the modern convention was essentially a “four-day 
infomercial” as CBS’s Dan Rather dismissively called it.123  Conventions are hardly 
irrelevant, however, for they offer the chance for the candidate to present himself and 
his ideas to the American people, and to showcase the important people who support 
him.  The Republican convention tried to shed the party’s hard-right “Gingrich” image 
through a theme of “Renewing America’s Purpose.  Together.”124  True to Bush’s entire 
campaign, the convention was meticulously crafted and featured such endorsements as 
Presidents Gerald Ford and George H.W. Bush, General Colin Powell, Elizabeth Dole, 
and former rival John McCain.  Most importantly, Bush came off very well 
(“presidential”) in his acceptance speech – and his healthy boost in the polls after the 
convention reflected that.  Shortly afterward and on the other side of the country, the 
Democrats convened in Los Angeles.  Gore had been consistently behind Bush in the 
polls by this time, and needed badly to define who he was and separate himself from 
Clinton.  Remarkably, Gore and the Democrats worked magic at their convention, with 
the help of speakers such as Bill Clinton, Ted Kennedy, Jesse Jackson, Bill Bradley, 
and Tipper Gore.  Al Gore himself delivered an energizing acceptance speech that 
clearly contrasted his positions on issues with Governor Bush’s, and then seperated
himself from President Clinton by providing the image of a populist, Old Democrat.  
Furthermore, the astounding seven-second kiss between Al and Tipper Gore 
symbolized his love and faithfulness to his wife, in direct contrast to Clinton’s infidelity . 
For the first time in several weeks, Al Gore surged past Bush in the polls.
By the time of the second element of the modern campaign, the debates, Gore 
and Bush were tied at the polls.  Although there is no declared “winner” of presidential 
debates, the media often brought in analysts to speculate on who they thought “won” as 
well as conducting extensive polling on who Americans thought “won.”  In general, Gore 
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is thought to have won two debates and Bush to have won one, but the debates actually 
hurt Gore even though he supposedly “won.”  This seeming paradox occurred because 
Gore was reputed to be the more articulate debater and more intelligent than Bush 
before the debates, and when Bush’s performance surpassed expectations, he certainly 
gained.  This was especially true in the foreign policy debate, in which Bush was 
perceived to be quite capable though he lacked Gore’s substantial experience.  
Furthermore, Gore’s aggressive approach in the first and most widely viewed debate, 
such as frequent interruptions of Bush, eye rolling, and disgusted facial expressions, 
indicated elitist behavior and disrespect for his opponent, which did not help his cause 
to improve his character points.  The one vice presidential debate, on the other hand, 
was a polite, respectful, and knowledgeable display by both Cheney and Lieberman, 
and both men came out in a very positive light – perhaps more positive than their 
respective running mates.
The third element of the modern campaign is the general media portrayal of the 
candidates.  In retrospect, the consensus is that the media on the whole tended to favor 
Bush during the campaigns.  This is exemplified by the ratio of positive and negative 
media stories, which both favored Bush.  The comeback of right-wing talk radio 
successfully projected its hatred of Clinton onto Gore.125  Moreover, there was no 
comparable “left-wing” radio, as there were far more conservatives than liberals on the 
airwaves.  Bush was also capable of turning character into an issue, of which he won 
decisively helped by the media’s portrayal Gore as robotic and Bush as charismatic.
Although Bush received the more favorable media on the whole, neither he nor 
Gore was spared the satiric media.  On Saturday Night Live, the comics had a field day 
depicting Bush as the dumb, smiling Daddy’s boy “Dubya,” and AlGore, the stiff and 
exaggeration-prone vice president.126 Overall, the caricatures of the two were similar to 
the Saturday Night L ive portrayal – Bush as an unintelligent idiot, and Gore as a serial 
exaggerator.  Unfortunately, Bush himself could also utilize the Al “I invented the 
internet” Gore image to his advantage, whereas it would certainly be seen as mean-
spirited if Gore emphasized Bush’s comparative lack of intelligence.
125
 Kellner 2001, 10.
126
 Kellner 2001, 7.
48
The Election Night Debacle
The election night chaos of 2000 occurred on November 7, 2000 – exactly 124 
years to the day after similar chaos in 1876.  As per usual, the networks were armed 
and ready with their teams of analysts, scoreboards, and red and blue digital United 
States maps.  Each network tried to reel in viewers early on with promises of fast and 
accurate results, with CBS’s Dan Rather proclaiming, “If we say somebody’s carried the 
state, you can take that to the bank.”127  These words would prove to be ominous.
The night began terribly for Bush as the networks called three battleground 
states, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Florida, for Gore.  Dan Rather commented, “Bush’s 
prospects of winning are shakier than cafeteria Jell-O.”128 Soon after, Bush told 
reporters he was skeptical of the network calls of Florida, where his brother Jeb was 
governor, and Pennsylvania, where his friend Tom Ridge was governor.129 Bush’s 
speculations proved accurate when around 10 pm, to the horror of the Gore supporters, 
the networks confessed that their previous call for Florida was based on faulty data and 
placed Florida back in the undecided category.130  It was declared around 11 pm that 
the Republicans had won the House of Representatives, while the Senate looked to be 
heading for a tie.  As the night dragged on, it became clear that whichever candidate 
won Florida would become the next president of the United States.  Shortly after 2 am, 
the networks, led by Fox, proceeded to call Florida for Bush – thus presumptively 
making him president-elect.  Dan Rather commented, “Sip it, savor it, cup it, photostat it, 
underline it in red, press it in a book, put it in an album, hang it on the wall.  George W. 
Bush is the next president of the United States.”131
After Florida was called decisively for Bush by the networks, Vice President Gore 
assumed he had lost the election and called Governor Bush at his mansion in Austin to 
concede and extend his congratulations.  Shortly after, Gore’s strategists called to 
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inform him that Bush’s advantage in Florida was only 6000, with many precincts still out.  
As the story was later recalled,
“…At 2:30 AM, Gore [called] his Republican rival and told 
him that circumstances had changed in the last 45 minutes.  
The race, Gore said, was now too close to call, and there 
would be an automatic recount in Florida.  He was going to 
wait it out.  ‘You mean to tell me, Mr. Vice President, you’re 
retracting your concession?’ Bush asked, his tone 
incredulous, one aid said…’You don’t have to be snippy 
about it,’ Gore responded…Bush told Gore that his brother 
Jeb, the governor of Florida, had just assured him that 
Florida was his, Gore aids said.  ‘Let me explain something,’ 
Gore said.  ‘Your younger brother is not the ultimate 
authority on this.’  The conversation drew quickly to a close.  
The election did not.”132
In the next few hours of the night, Gore picked up more electoral votes and 
surged ahead in the popular vote.  Gore was now winning the electoral vote, 267-246 
with Florida undecided.  The next morning, those who had gone to sleep after the 
networks had declared Bush to be president were surprised to learn that the election 
was unresolved, and probably wouldn’t be resolved for days.  Others read newspapers 
that had not been recalled from the printing presses when the networks recanted on 
Florida that declared Bush as the victor, though the televised news told a story of 
impending recounts.  The fate of the presidency depended on the verdict in Florida, 
where an incomplete count had Bush leading by a scant 1,784 votes out of more than 
six million cast in the state.
Although the election of 2000 would ultimately involve much finger-pointing, the 
blame for the debacle on election night can safely be bestowed on the media and Voter 
New Service (VNS).  Each network, in its race to be the first with new results, made 
some extremely dubious calls on election night.  The VNS projections also turned out to 
be faulty, as in the Florida case when VNS called Florida for Gore based on the 
projection that Gore would take the lead in the state when the returns from the more 
populous Democratic counties were included.133  When it became apparent that Gore 
was not gaining fast enough to overtake Bush, the networks removed Florida from 
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Gore’s column.  In addition, it was later discovered that Bush’s cousin John Ellis who 
worked for Fox had helped make the call for Bush, and that Fox had made the call
without VNS polling data.134  These were highly unfortunate circumstances for Gore, 
who would ultimately have to overcome the presumption that Bush had won the election 
in order to fully prevail in his efforts.
The Florida Controversies
Overview: Florida is the U.S.’s fourth most populous state, differing from other 
populous states because it is not dominated by a single metropolitan area (like Chicago 
in Illinois or New York City in New York), and its population is instead distributed among 
several regional centers.135  It is highly diverse ethnically and religiously, with large 
numbers of Protestant and Jewish retirees, Cuban Americans, African Americans, and 
both blue and white collar whites.  Gore ran the best in industrial, university, and 
governmental cities such as Miami, Tampa, St. Petersburg, Tallahassee, and 
Gainesville.136  Bush ran the best in Pensacola and Jacksonville, which have large 
military installations; the rural areas of the state; the affluent retirement communities of 
Sarasota and Fort Meyers; and the Cuban American parts of Miami.137 The regions of 
Florida without dominant social groups, such as Orlando and Daytona Beach, divided 
their support between the two candidates evenly.
The Palm Beach “Butterfly Ballot”: The first anomaly of the presidential election in 
Florida became evident by November 8: a confusing and possibly illegal ballot used in 
Palm Beach County (see Appendix).  Florida law required that the names of all 
candidates for any partisan elected office in a given election had to be listed on the 
ballot in the order in which each political party’s candidate for governor had finished in 
the most recent election for that office.138  The Palm Beach ballot had an  unusual format 
of candidate names listed on columns, one to the left and one to the right, of the 
perforations in the middle where the punch-card vote was to be recorded.  The 
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reasoning behind this layout was that Theresa La Pore, a Democrat county clerk, was 
afraid that listing ten candidates in one column would require a small print that many 
elderly voters in Palm Beach County would be unable to read.  The problem with the 
ballot was that it did not correspond to the legally required rank – since Jeb Bush, a 
Republican, had won the last governor’s election, George W. Bush was supposed to be 
listed first and Al Gore second – but in fact to vote for Al Gore, one had to punch the 
third hole, even though Gore was listed directly below Bush.  The candidate who 
occupied hole #2 was Pat Buchanan, which violated the law since the Reform Party had 
not received the second-highest amount of votes in the last governor’s election.  Pat 
Buchanan, who had never even campaigned in Palm Beach County, finished with 3,704 
votes in the steadfastly Democratic county – nearly 2,700 more than Buchanan had 
received in any of Florida’s other sixty-six counties.139
The Palm Beach butterfly ballot created havoc on both Election Day and the 
following day.  Scores of voters confused by the ballot voted for candidates other than 
the one they wished to support, and some who had discovered their errors tried to 
remedy them by punching again for their true intentions (“overvotes”), which disqualified 
their ballots since they had cast two votes for president.  In an affidavit for the 
subsequent lawsuit, one woman wrote:
“I had reviewed the sample ballot before going to the polling 
place, and had even gone through training to serve as a poll 
worker.  Even though I was familiar with the sample ballot 
and had voted many times before, I found the ballot I 
received on November 7 very confusing.  It did not 
correspond to the sample ballot I had received…because I 
was so confused, though, I asked a poll worker for 
assistance lining up the holes on the ballot properly, and 
informed her that I was having trouble lining up the holes to 
see which hole I should punch to vote for Vice President Al 
Gore…She did not provide me with the assistance I 
requested in lining up the ballot in the voting machine, and 
just told me I should ‘punch the hole near Vice President 
Gore’s name’ in order to vote for him.  This was not at all 
helpful to me, since my problem was that I could not tell 
which was the hole nearest to Vice President Gore’s 
name…I punched the second hole on the ballot, believing 
that to be the correct hole to punch in order to vote for [Gore] 
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since it was listed second on the ballot.  I was not certain I 
had voted correctly, but I was ashamed to ask for help again, 
especially since the poll worker had refused to help when I 
first asked for assistance.  My husband…noticed my 
confusion and told me that a poll worker had informed him 
that the proper way to vote for [Gore] was to punch both the 
second and third holes on the ballot in order to vote for both 
Vice President Gore and Senator Lieberman.  This seemed 
very unusual and surprising to me, but I believed it since I 
understood it was what the poll worker had instructed us to 
do.”140
The Bush team contended that the dramatic showing for Buchanan in Palm 
Beach County was the true intent of the voters.  However, Palm Beach County has a 
sizable elderly Jewish population, and it is very difficult to believe that so many Jewish 
voters would support a candidate who once wrote a book criticizing the U.S. for entering 
World War II against Germany instead of Al Gore’s running -mate Joe Lieberman, an 
orthodox Jew.  Statistical analysis based on the absentee ballots (which were not of the 
butterfly format) as the control group later revealed that people who voted on Election 
Day in Palm Beach county were over four times as likely to vote for Buchanan than 
those who voted in the county via absentee ballot.141  Moreover, there were an 
additional 5,264 overvotes for Gore and Buchanan, 2,862 overvotes for Gore and 
McReynolds of the Socialist Party (the hole directly below Gore’s), and 1,319 overvotes 
for Gore and Libertarian Harry Browne (listed directly below Gore, two holes down from 
Gore).142  The combined effects of the problematic Buchanan vote in addition to the 
overvote may have cost Gore as many as 10,000 votes, and certainly the election.
The result of the butterfly mayhem was votes for third party candidates 
unintended by voters, and 29,000 votes in the presidential election of Palm Beach 
County thrown out due to no record of a presidential vote (“undervote”) or an overvote, 
totaling 4% of votes cast in the county.143  The problems of the butterfly ballot did not 
afflict the vote for Governor Bush in the same way since he was listed first on the ballot
and corresponded to the first hole, and therefore had less chance of voter confusion.  
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Statistical analysis confirmed this.  On November 8, 2000, three angry Palm Beach 
residents who said they mistakenly voted for Buchanan when they had intended to vote 
for Vice President Gore filed a lawsuit in the state circuit court challenging the validity of 
the Palm Beach vote.144  This lawsuit was not associated with the Gore team.
Although the Palm Beach ballot was a huge issue and most people think its 
difficulties cost Gore the election, there were very few options for the Gore team to 
pursue.  There was virtually no way to disentangle the Gore vote from the Buchanan 
vote, even as anomalous as the results were.  There only seemed to be two plausible 
options: first, the campaign could ask a judge to reapportion the overvotes according to 
the same distributions of votes that had been recorded in other Florida counties; and 
second, the campaign could request a new election.145  Neither of these options 
seemed very plausible, as it was highly unlikely that judges would agree to assign Gore 
votes that he legally did not receive when it would change the results of an election, and 
a new election contradicted federal law that required uniform dates for presidential 
elections and would certainly be influenced by the present knowledge of the national 
outcome.146  Thus, the Gore campaign decided not to initially pursue any legal action in 
Palm Beach County.
“Vote for Gore and Brown!”: An another unfortunate anomaly for Gore occurred in 
Duval County (Jacksonville), where many African American voters lived.  The Get Out 
the Vote Drive in Duval County had spectacular success as black voters turned out in 
record numbers to vote for Gore and Corrine Brown, a black Democratic 
Congresswoman.147  The phrase for the joint campaign was, “Vote for Gore and Brown.”  
So thousands of voters in predominantly black precincts voted for Gore on the first page 
of their ballots, then turned to the next page to vote for Browne – Harry Browne, the 
Libertarian candidate for president.148 The sample ballot sent out to voters for the 
election had instructed voters to “vote on all pages,” so voter confusion was certainly 
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possible.149 Around 26,000 votes were invalidated in Duval County as overvotes, 
around four times as many as in 1996.150
Further Anomalies: Other more minor anomalies occurred in Florida on Election 
Day as well.  The Volusia County election results were delayed several hours because 
of a computer disk error that subtracted 16,000 votes from Gore and added hundreds to 
Bush in one precinct.151  In several counties, dozens of registered voters complained 
that they were denied the right to vote because their names did not appear on voter 
logs.  In Pinellas County, a second recount had to be conducted after the first recount 
showed an increase of more than 400 votes for Gore – it turned out that some votes 
had been “overlooked” on election night and hadn’t been counted the first time.152
The Gore Strategy: The statewide machine recount of the ballots was completed 
on November 10, and Bush’s lead had shrunk to just 327 votes.  The remarkable 
narrowness of the vote and the fact that totals could change after a recount were 
psychological shocks that made Bush’s claim to victory appear even shakier.153 The 
Gore team wanted to avoid litigation, and decided to pursue the route of manual 
recounts that would hopefully find enough legally cast votes to overcome Bush’s lead.154
Of over six million votes cast on November 7, 2000, around 174,000 of these 
votes were not counted, because they were either overvotes or undervotes.  The 
overvotes numbered about 110,000, while the undervotes numbered around 64,000.  
The Gore campaign had to use the presence of anomalies in traditional Democratic 
counties to its advantage and press the question as to whether Bush really won Florida.  
In complement to this, the campaign stressed that Al Gore had won the national popular 
vote by over a half million, which increased Gore’s symbolic legitimacy and provided 
him the patience of the American people while recounts were administered.  The Gore 
team then pursued the strategy of examining the undervotes of four selected highly 
Democratic counties (Volusia, Broward, Miami-Dade, and Palm Beach) via a hand 
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recount, which was allowed under Florida state law.155 The hand recount would also 
identify votes that the voter had written in Vice President Gore or Governor Bush rather 
than using the appropriate punch hole.  It seemed like a workable strategy at the time 
because it was perceived as legit and normal by most Americans, and it would not force 
Gore to concede.156  It also proposed to count more ballots rather than less, which 
would ultimately be the Gore team’s recount theme.
A theme that should have been pressed more by the Gore campaign but was not 
until it was almost too late was the fact that ballot spoilage occurred at its highest rates 
in African American regions.  For example, almost one third of ballots in black sections 
of Republican Duval County were invalidated, a rate of four times as many as in the 
white precincts of the same county.157  These black sections, of course, corresponded 
with the poor section of town, where literacy rates were lower and voter confusion more 
likely. Gasden County, a largely poor black and rural area, had an astronomical 12% 
spoilage rate because of a confusing ballot with presidential candidates listed in two 
columns – and most of the spoilage was due to overvotes.158 Furthermore, black voters 
were more likely to encounter voting equipment that was prone to not registering a 
legally cast vote: in the richer, and correspondingly whiter, counties of Florida, optical 
scanning voting machines were used (with a failure rate of less than a percent), while a 
full four percent of the cheaper punch card systems were likely fail to register a vote for 
president.159  Since the National Association of the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP) had had enormous success with its get out the vote effort in Florida, the ballot 
spoilage rate among African Americans in Florida was certainly disappointing.  A 
Republican strategist commented, “The NAACP did a tremendous job of turnout in 
Florida.  But in a way they overachieved, and got people out who couldn’t follow 
instructions.”160
The problem with recounting the undervotes associated with these four counties 
was soon to become a household term: “chads,” or the paper covering the perforations.
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Three out of the four counties (all except Volusia) used punch card ballots, and 
sometimes the chads did not fully detach after being poked by a stylus.  The challenge 
would soon become to discern voter intent from these chads, and if the chads were not 
fully detached constituted a vote.
Vice President Gore had to be cautious with his strategy in the post-election days 
from the very moment he took back his concession, for it was he who had the burden of 
proof.  This sort of situation had never occurred before in modern times, and he had to 
think of the long-term implications of his actions in the early days.  His strategy was sure 
to be more aggressive than Governor Bush’s, who had the presumptive title of 
president-elect.  However, the situation was even more dire for Gore because if he lost 
this election, he had no official position; whereas if Bush lost, he still remained governor 
of Texas.161
The Bush Strategy: The result of the automatic machine recount was interpreted 
differently by the Bush team.  The Gore side contended that the results of the automatic 
recount indicated flaws in the voting equipment and hence that machines were 
unreliable.162  The Bush side, on the other hand, determined that the result of the 
recount was not the work of machines alone.  Moreover, unlike the Gore side, there was 
no evidence that Bush voters had any difficulty voting for their candidate.163  The Bush 
strategy, then, in the words of Bush lawyer Ben Ginsberg, was “to validate the results of 
the election and fight all further searches for votes.”164  This meant going to court, even 
though the Bush team admitted its reluctance in involving the courts.  So, on November 
10, the Bush team brought its suit to federal court asking for an injunction to “stop the 
hand counts on equal protection grounds that there were no standards for conducting 
recounts and that it constituted an unlawful depreciation of the votes in some counties if 
only votes in selected counties were counted.”165  James Baker, former chief of staff
and Bush counsel, commented, “It is precisely for these reasons that over the years our 
democracy has moved increasingly from hand counting of votes to machine counting. 
161
 Ceaser and Busch 2001, 73.
162
 Ceaser and Busch 2001, 182.
163
 Gillman 2001, 28.
164
 Ibid.
165
 Ceaser and Busch 2001, 182.
57
Machines are neither Republicans nor Democrats, and therefore can be neither 
consciously nor unconsciously biased.”166
The choice to take the case to federal court instead of state court was no 
oversight – it was clearly a strategic decision to take the controversial case out of 
Florida and therefore out of the hands of locally elected judges as quickly as possible.167
Furthermore, federal courts are generally more unwilling than state courts to reverse 
election results.168  The Republicans also probably noted that the U.S. Supreme Court, 
with mostly Republican appointees, would probably be more sympathetic to its cause 
than the Florida Supreme Court, with mostly Democratic appointees.
The Month-long Battle Over Chads
The Democrats were delighted to have forced the Republicans into filing the first 
lawsuit.  Gore campaign lawyer Warren Christopher commented, “If Governor Bush 
truly believes that he has won the election in Florida, he should not have any reason to 
doubt or fear to have the machine count checked by a hand count.”169 On Monday, 
November 13, 2000, the Democrats received their first victory when Judge 
Middlebrooks ruled against the Bush request to halt the recounts, and explained that in 
the Constitution, “the responsibility for the selection of electors for the office of President 
rests primarily with the people of Florida, its election officials, and if necessary, its 
courts.”170  The Bush team appealed this ruling to the Eleventh Circuit in Atlanta two 
days later.
Meanwhile, all four counties had formally agreed to the Gore team’s request for 
hand recounts, and thus began the haggling over chads.  In the following weeks, much 
of the dispute over the hand count would be centered on these tiny bits of paper and 
whether they were detached enough to be considered a legal vote.  Florida state law 
had no statutory provisions to determine what constituted a legal vote, and instead 
ambiguously referred to “voter intent.”  Chads might be hanging on to the ballot by one, 
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two, or even four corners.  A “hanging” chad was attached to the ballot by two or fewer 
corners, and a “pregnant” or “dimpled” chad was attached by all four corners but had 
signs that it had been punched with the stylus.171 Since there was no method indicated 
in state law, the counties were allowed to choose their own standard of counting the 
votes.  In Volusia County, the canvassing board began its hand count by administering 
“the sunshine test,” which determined a vote had been cast if light gleamed through the 
hole.172  This test was soon abandoned for the more strict “three-corner rule,” which 
would count a vote only if the chad was “hanging.”173  Palm Beach County likewise only 
recorded hanging chads, while Broward County counted both hanging and dimpled.
The canvassing boards of all four counties were largely Democrats, and it could 
be argued that they would be more favorable to Gore.  However, observers from both 
sides watched as the votes were counted and voiced their objections when they did not 
agree.  Considering this, the Bush team had a noticeable advantage since it could 
easily stall recount efforts in a nation whose laws give deadlines great importance.  It is 
hard for anyone to disagree that the Bush team did not deliberately stall the recounts, 
as many journalists observing the procedure reported Republican challenges to votes 
they considered to be clearly punched.174  In other cases, Republicans just failed to 
provide enough counters to assemble the counting teams.  On the other hand, 
Republicans did have a legitimate complaint when they argued that the more the ballots 
were handled, the more likely that the chad would detach.  Some even went as far as to 
accuse the Democrats of handling the ballots roughly so the chads would detach, and 
one Republican observer even accused a Democratic observer of eating the chads.175
The Battle Against Katherine Harris
On Monday, November 13, Florida Secretary of State and co-chair of the Bush 
campaign election team of Florida Katherine Harris announced that she would enforce a 
November 14 legal deadline for certifying the statewide vote, and would certify the 
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election results on November 18 when the overseas ballots had been added in. She 
also stated that she had no intention of accepting the recount totals, for in her opinion 
the recounts only should have been undertaken if evidence showing the failure of the 
performance of the machines in the machine recount.176  This was immediately attacked 
by the Gore team as “[A] plan…to produce a particular result in the election rather than 
to ensure that the voice of all the citizens of the state should be heard.”177  Moreover, 
Gore supporters pointed out that late election results “may be ignored” by the secretary, 
which indicated that they did not have to be ignored.  Only one county, Volusia, looked 
able to complete its count by the deadline; Palm Beach and Broward were in the 
process and Miami-Dade had not even begun.  To their joy, the Florida Supreme Court, 
acting on its own initiative, issued an injunction ordering the secretary of state not to 
proceed with the certification and ordered the hand counting to continue.
Meanwhile, on November 15, Vice President Gore shocked the Bush team by 
asking for a statewide hand recount and pledging to end an end to all legal challenges 
when the count was complete.  This was a risky move for him, because Bush could 
potentially pick up extra votes from Republican strongholds.  Nevertheless, it went along 
beautifully with his “count every vote” strategy and created the perception that he 
wanted to be fair and would generously give up his protest if the recounts proved he 
had not won.  Bush appeared three hours later and politely rejected Gore’s offer, stating 
that the manual vote counting in Florida was not subject to a uniform standard.
The Overseas Ballot Debacle: The count of the overseas ballots occurred on 
November 18, and by law was supposed to be the last event before final certification.178
These ballots consisted of two main groups: military voters and Floridian civilians living 
abroad, mainly U.S. diplomats.  The balloting went nearly two to one for George W. 
Bush (1,380 to 750) and increased his lead to 930 votes.  Like the counting of the 
punch-card ballots, counties applied vastly different standards to counting these ballots.  
Katherine Harris had instructed counties to accept otherwise-valid ballots from overseas 
that were postmarked after Election Day, but some counties openly defied these 
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instructions insisting that Harris had misinterpreted the law.179 State law requires that 
overseas votes be postmarked.  Her instructions were seen as a partisan move to 
maximize the overseas votes, which were expected to favor Bush.  Canvassing boards 
in Democratic counties threw out ballots at a far higher rate than those in Republican 
counties, perhaps in part because Republican-dominated counties accepted ballots 
postmarked after the election or with no postmarks, while Democratic counties rejected 
them.180  In an interesting paradox, Republicans, who had previously been arguing strict 
legal procedures now argued for intent, while Democrats, who had previously been 
arguing for intent, now argued for strict legal procedures.181  Moreover, the Republicans 
urged leeway for the military ballots on a moral high ground, since they were overseas 
fighting for their country.  The civilian ballots, mostly Gore votes, were clearly 
identifiable with respect to the military ballots, but the same Republicans who urged 
leeway with the military ballots urged the opposite for these ballots.
The Bush team knew the exclusion of so many military votes was political 
dynamite.182  They accused the Gore team of trying to prevent the servicemen from 
voting.  Since the Gore campaign had been arguing from the beginning that all the votes 
should be counted, there was little it could do without appearing hypocritical.183 Some 
on the Gore side mused why the vote of a soldier was worth more than that of an inner-
city voter, but they did not press the issue.184 The Gore team was clearly defeated on 
this issue when Vice President candidate Joseph Lieberman requested Florida election 
officials to reconsider their rejection of the military ballots, even if they didn’t comply with 
the law.185
A New Lawsuit in Seminole County: A new lawsuit popped up shortly after a New 
York Times reporter revealed that Republicans had corrected thousands of absentee 
ballots in Seminole County, a suburban county north of Orlando.  Sandra Goard, the 
Republican election official, had allowed party workers to correct thousands of 
applications in her own office for absentee ballots that had missing voter identification 
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numbers.186  The effect of her actions was to provide at least 4,700 absentee ballots to 
Republican voters whose applications should have been rejected (since the voter 
identification was missing).  Democrats claimed that this was a violation of Florida laws 
on the handling of absentee ballots.  Moreover, Miss Goard had allowed the Republican 
Party workers to separate their applications from the Democratic absentee applications 
with the same problem, and these applications were thrown out without allowing the 
Democrats the same opportunity to make them comply with state law.187 A local 
Democratic lawyer, Harry Jacobs, filed suit seeking to identify the votes that had been 
cast through the modified ballot applications.188  He did not think they would be 
recovered, however, so he would likely seek to have every absentee ballot in the county 
thrown out – which would have swung the election to Gore if successful.
The Florida Supreme Court’s First Decision:  On Monday, November 20, the Gore 
and Bush teams assembled to argue Palm Beach v. Harris to the Florida Supreme 
Court.  The case was really three cases, with appeals from Volusia County Canvassing 
Board and the Florida Democratic Party as appellants under the blanket name of the 
petitioner, Palm Beach County Canvassing Board.  The Gore team argued to allow the 
hand count to continue and for the court to set new feasible deadlines, and the Bush 
team argued that this action would in effect replace the executive branch with the 
judicial branch and violate separation of powers.189  The Florida Supreme Court issued 
its unanimous decision the next morning, which stated:
“Because of the unique circumstances and extraordinary 
importance of the present case, wherein the Florida Attorney 
General and the Florida Secretary of State have issued 
conflicting advisory opinions concerning the propriety of 
conducting the manual recounts, we conclude we must 
invoke the equitable powers of this Court to fashion a 
remedy that will allow a fair and expeditious resolution of the 
questions presented here.”190
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The decision set a new deadline on Sunday, November 26, at 5 pm, and directed that 
the hand counts would continue and would be included in the final totals.191  Bush 
lawyers announced that they would appeal the decision to the U.S. Supreme Court.
A Return to Palm Beach and Seminole: At the same time as the Florida 
Supreme Court hearing against Katherine Harris, progress was made on both the 
Butterfly Ballot case of Palm Beach County and the absentee ballot case of Seminole 
County.  In the former, Judge Jorge Labarga ruled that he did not have the authority to 
order a county-wide revote.  In his ruling, he recognized that there were times when the 
laws of Florida and other times had been construed to allow for this extraordinary 
remedy, but none had ever involved presidential elections.192  In Seminole County, 
which had allowed Republican Party workers to correct thousands of absentee ballots, 
Judge Debra Nelson rejected Republican efforts to throw out the lawsuit and scheduled 
a hearing.
Martin County: Ironically, Seminole County was not the only county that had 
allowed Republican Party workers to correct absentee ballots, for the same problem 
was discovered in Martin County.  Martin County, located in a rural region of Florida 
between Orlando and Miami, went for Bush 56% to 44%.  Problems arose, however, 
when it was discovered that the Martin County supervisor of elections, a Republican, 
had allowed Republican Party workers to take away the absentee ballot requests to add 
voter identification numbers and resubmit them.193  Like the case in Seminole County, 
the elections office had allowed other incomplete applications submitted by 
independents and Democrats to stack up without correction and without providing the 
same opportunity to the Democrats.  The Democrats filed a lawsuit on December 2, 
Taylor v. Martin County Canvassing Board that would be a net gain of 2,815 votes for 
Gore if successful.194
Nassau County: Nassau County, safely in Bush territory in the far northeastern 
corner of the state, suddenly became part of the Florida controversy when its automatic 
recount of more than 23,000 votes produced 218 votes fewer than the first count, 
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subtracting 51 total votes from Bush.195  The canvassing board had initially certified the 
recount, but rescinded that certification and reverted to the original the Friday before 
Harris’s official certification.  Katherine Harris accepted this recertification, and 
appropriately added the 51 votes back into Bush’s totals on Sunday night.  The 
Democrats were upset at what they deemed another partisan move by Harris, and Gore 
lawyer David Boies planned to include Nassau County in the lawsuit to contest the 
election results.
Miami-Dade Throws in the Towel: On Wednesday, November 22, Miami-
Dade County canvassing board decided to cease the recounts of that county because 
they would not be able to finish counting the county’s 700,000 ballots by Sunday 
evening.196  Initially, they had decided to only count the approximately 10,000 
undervotes, but Republican observers demonstrated chaotically in the building when 
this decision was announced.  This meant that the 157 votes Gore had gained thus far 
in the Miami-Dade recount were invalidated again, along with the other potential hidden 
votes among the undervotes.  The Gore team filed suit to compel the canvassing board 
to continue the recount, but the Florida Supreme Court refused unanimously.
The U.S. Supreme Court Steps In: In a surprising move, the United States 
Supreme Court agreed to hear the case that the Bush team had appealed, now 
renamed Bush v. Palm Beach Canvassing Board.  The Bush team’s basic argument 
was that the Florida Supreme Court had established new rules (and therefore changed 
the law) when it interpreted the state’s election law to require that late-filed returns be 
counted rather than ignored, as one section of state law specified.197  The Gore team’s 
response was that by reading the state election law to provide the flexibility necessary 
to determine the will of the voters, the state court was interpreting the law as it had 
always been.198
The initial response to the Court’s decision was surprise that the justices would 
intervene in a matter that had traditionally been under the jurisdiction of state law; 
especially the five conservative justices who had a track record of promoting federalism.  
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An observer commented that “a decision split along the court’s usual ideological fault 
line could be questioned [as] partisan…perhaps damaging the court’s credibility and 
doing little to calm the political tempest.”199  Conservative legal scholars believed that 
the Court would not have even taken the case unless it planned on reversing the Florida 
Supreme Court, even at the risk of being labeled partisan.200
The Certification: On Sunday, November 26, Secretary of State Katherine Harris 
performed the final certification of the Florida statewide vote.  Unfortunately for the Gore 
team, Palm Beach County could not make the deadline and Harris refused to give them 
until the next morning to finish.  They finished at 7 pm Sunday night with a net gain of 
192 votes for Gore, a half hour before Harris was to announce the certification.  Thus, 
the figures from the machine recount from Palm Beach County and Miami-Dade 
Counties were used since she interpreted state law as requiring a full recount. Gore 
had gained 567 votes in Broward County, which had finished its counting on Saturday 
night.  She certified George W. Bush as the winner of Florida by a margin of 537 votes.
After the certification, Gore’s running-mate Senator Lieberman appeared on television 
from Washington to condemn “what by any reasonable standard is an incomplete and 
inaccurate count.”201  Clearly, Gore was not going to concede yet.
Gore Contests the Election
The following day, on Monday, November 27, Al Gore formally contested the 
election by filing a lawsuit in Florida state circuit court.  His lawsuit stated that the vote 
totals certified the previous day by the Florida Secretary of State were wrong, and that 
thousands of votes in Nassau, Miami-Dade, and Palm Beach Counties remained 
uncounted.202  Had these votes been counted into the certified totals, Vice President 
Gore would have won. The Republicans moved to dismiss the suit, citing the following 
reasons: 1) Gore could not contest the results because technically he was not a 
candidate in the election, only his electors were; 2) Manually counting only part of the 
ballots is illegal; 3) Some “dimpled” ballots, especially in Broward county, were counted 
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as votes; and 4) Gore’s lawsuit was filed past the legal deadline.203  The Republicans 
were planning to call ninety-five witnesses at the trial, which Democrats accused to be a 
stalling technique.  The case was to be heard by Judge N. Sanders Sauls, a 
Republican, and it was to begin on December 2 despite Gore pleas for an earlier date.
Republicans struck back the next day when a special committee of the Florida 
legislature met to call for a special legislative session that would appoint its own slate of 
Florida electors if the disputes were not resolved by December 12.204  In the hearing, 
Republican legal experts cited the Electoral Count Act of 1887 that said “the legislature 
must appoint electors if the results are in doubt, either because of an unresolved 
contest or because the results were produced by counting procedures that were altered 
after Election Day.”205  The committee voted for the special legislative session, along 
partisan lines.  Meanwhile, President Bill Clinton denied the Bush team the $5.3 million 
federal transition fund until the presidential race was resolved.
The U.S. Supreme Court Hearing: On December 1, 2000 the Bush and Gore 
“dream teams” of lawyers argued before the United States Supreme Court in Bush v. 
Palm Beach County Canvassing Board.  This hearing was in regards to the appeal filed 
by the Bush team after the Florida Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Gore team by 
allowing the recount results to be included in final certification and by extending the 
deadline.  The Bush argument was that the Florida court changed the rules, and the 
Gore argument was that the decision was an “ordinary exercise in statutory 
interpretation.”206  These arguments were subjected to intense questioning by the nine 
Supreme Court justices, of which many observers claimed a noticeable bias for a 
particular side for each justice based on their respective questioning (with the exception 
of Clarence Thomas, who routinely does not ask questions).  These observers 
maintained the usual ideological split of the justices in reference to this case, meaning 
the reliable conservatives (Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, O’Connor, and Thomas) 
tending to side with the Bush lawyers while the moderates/liberals (Ginsburg, Stevens, 
Souter, and Breyer) tending to side with the Gore lawyers.  There was some doubt 
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about Justices O’Connor and Kennedy, and many thought that these two justices would 
be the deciding factors.
The justices delivered their opinion the following Monday, a per curiam 
(unanimous) decision that stated:
“After reviewing the opinion of the Florida Supreme Court, 
we find ‘that there is considerable uncertainty as to the 
precise grounds for the decision.’  …Specifically, we are 
unclear as to the extent to which the Florida Supreme Court 
saw the Florida Constitution as circumscribing the 
legislature’s authority…The judgment of the Supreme Court 
of Florida is therefore vacated, and the case is remanded for 
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.”207
This meant that the U.S. Supreme Court wanted the Florida Supreme Court to clarify 
the basis for its decision, and that for the moment the existing decision was not 
operative.208  Many thought that the decision was in fact not unanimous among the 
justices – that instead the Court was trying to prevent criticism that would inevitably 
befall it if it had ruled along the usual ideological split.209  Moreover, a common 
interpretation of the decision was that of a slap on the wrist to the Florida Supreme 
Court by the U.S. Supreme Court – signaling that the U.S. Supreme Court was watching 
the Florida Supreme Court and would not hesitate to intervene.210
The Butterfly Dies: The same day as the U.S. Supreme Court oral arguments, 
the Gore team suffered a defeat in the infamous butterfly ballot case.  On appeal to the 
Florida Supreme Court, the justices had unanimously ruled against overturning Judge 
Labarga’s decision, noting:
“A court should not void an election for ballot form defects 
unless such defects cause the ballot to be in substantial 
noncompliance with the statutory election 
requirements…[and that] such defects operate to prevent [a] 
free, fair and open choice…We conclude as a matter lf law 
that the Palm Beach County ballot does not constitute 
substantial noncompliance with statutory requirements…”211
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The Contested Election Trial Begins: The lawsuit to officially contest the election, 
known as Gore v. Harris in Leon County Circuit Court, began the same day as the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s oral hearing (December 2) with presiding Judge N. Sanders Sauls.  
Gore’s lawyer David Boies argued that the 9,000 unexamined Miami-Dade undervotes 
included uncounted legal votes and that a hand count of these ballots would be able to 
determine voter intent from a good portion of these ballots.212  Boies also argued that 
the Nassau County decision to certify the original count rather than the automatic 
recount was contrary to statutory requirements, and that fifty-one votes should be added 
for Gore.213  Furthermore, the 192 recovered votes from Palm Beach County along with 
the 51 votes from Nassau County should be immediately readjusted in Gore’s official 
totals.  Finally Boies asked for a judicial review of 3,800 disputed Palm Beach ballots.
Bush lawyer Barry Richard replied to these arguments that canvassing boards were 
given authority under state law to make decisions about recounts, and that their 
decisions held unless there was evidence to show they had abused their authority, 
which there clearly wasn’t in the Miami-Dade and Palm Beach cases.  In a ruling on 
Monday, December 4, Sauls rejected Gore’s arguments entirely, writing:
“There is no credible statistical evidence and no other 
competent substantial evidence to establish by a 
preponderance a reasonable probability that the results of 
the statewide election in the State of Florida would be 
different from the result which has been certified by the State 
Elections Canvassing Commission.”214
It was a devastating decision for the Gore team, one that former Clinton Chief of Staff 
called the beginning of the “Hail Mary” phase of this election.215  Gore lawyers 
announced they would appeal the decision to the Florida Supreme Court.  The Florida 
Supreme Court agreed to hear the case on Thursday, December 7.
Florida Legislature Steps In: The Florida State Legislature on December 6 
announced that they would appoint a set of presidential electors who would support 
Governor George W. Bush if the Florida Supreme Court reverses Bush’s victory in the 
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state.216  The state Democratic lawmakers, who could not block the move, tarred this 
action as a partisan effort devised by Jeb Bush for his brother.  The Republican 
lawmakers insisted that they only wanted to make sure the voters of Florida were not 
disenfranchised.217  Many saw the state legislature’s action as a warning shot from the 
legislative to the judicial branch.
Lewis and Clark Expedition: In an ironic coincidence, the Seminole and Martin 
absentee ballot cases were to be heard on the same day (December 8), by Judges 
Nikki Clark and Terry Lewis respectively.  The lawsuits, which were not officially 
associated with the Gore campaign (this would go against Gore’s “count every vote” 
strategy), sought to discount the all the absentee ballots of Seminole and Martin 
Counties because Republican workers had been allowed to fix voter applications which 
otherwise would have been thrown out. An alternative method offered by the plaintiffs 
was to throw out ballots according to a statistical formula.  Republican lawyers argued 
that the act of altering ballot applications was not enough to alter the outcome of the 
election.218 Victory for either plaintiff would effectively overturn the election since Bush 
had heavily carried both counties.
The Gore side knew these two lawsuits were long shots, and indeed they were.  
Despite the fact that both cases were ruled upon by Democratic judges, both had the 
same outcome that was not favorable to Gore.  They ruled that while the election 
supervisors certainly had violated the Florida statutes, their actions were not egregious 
enough to necessitate the nullification of all absentee ballots in the two counties.219  Nor 
were they going to substitute a statistical formula to alter the totals.  The plaintiffs 
promised to appeal.
It is necessary to point out that by the time of the Lewis and Clark rulings, a full 
month and a day had passed since Election Day.  The American public was getting tired 
of recounts and lawsuits, despite strong signs of initial public patience to find out the 
true winner.  George W. Bush’s legitimacy had surely begun to sink in, for not once in 
the past month had he been behind in the official totals.  Moreover, he had mostly kept 
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himself in the shadow of the post-election controversy, stepping out only after he had 
been certified the winner of Florida.  Gore had also kept himself out of the spotlight 
especially at the beginning of the controversy, but the persistent efforts of his campaign
to lengthen the election projected the image of a “Sore Loserman” onto the candidate 
himself.  Whether the election was ultimately fair or unfair, the American people were 
just getting tired of hearing about it.
Florida Supreme Court, Round 2: The Gore team and lawyer David Boies argued 
before the Florida Supreme Court once again on Thursday, December 7th on the appeal 
of Judge Sauls’s decision (Gore v. Harris).  The arguments were largely the same as 
the case against Judge Sauls, but Boies had to answer pointed and tough questions 
from five Florida justices.  The justices mused about whether the court had a proper role 
in this appeal and if it could legitimately overrule Sauls who had decisively ruled against 
Gore.220
Nevertheless, the Florida Supreme Court ruled for Gore in an astounding 4 to 3 
decision.  The court stated that Judge Sauls had utilized an exceptionally high standard 
in his decision that Gore had not proved the disputed ballots should be counted.221 The 
major premise of their ruling was from the Florida contest statute, which required judges 
to correct any problems that might be caused when a certified election result fails to 
include an adequate number of legal votes casts doubt on the certified result’s 
accuracy.222 The ruling ordered recounts to begin in every county in the state, not just 
the counties selected by Gore.  In addition, the Court ordered Bush’s official 537 vote 
lead trimmed to just 154, which included the full Palm Beach recount and the partial 
Miami-Dade recount.223  The ruling did not address the 51 votes from Nassau County, 
and it also did not offer a standard for vote counting other than “intent of the voter.”  The 
Court ordered that whichever candidate won the statewide recount would be awarded 
Florida’s electoral votes.  The majority ruling contained language that was deliberate, 
careful, and anticipatory of the equal protections argument, indicating acknowledgment 
of the Supreme Court’s earlier “warning.”  The Court also refused to define a standard 
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for manually recounting the votes so that the Bush team could not accuse it of creating 
new law.
The ruling was clearly controversial within the Florida Supreme Court since the 
decision was 4-3, whereas it usually issues unanimous opinions.  Furthermore, Chief 
Justice Wells dissenting opinion was particularly heated: 
“I have a deep and abiding concern that the prolonging of 
judicial process in this counting contest propels this country 
and this state into an unnecessary constitutional crisis.  I 
have to conclude that there is a real and present likelihood 
that this constitutional crisis will do substantial damage to 
our country, our state, and to this court as an institution.”224
This ruling could not be labeled as partisan because the division among the justices 
was not along traditional ideological lines.  Justice Shaw, who was considered the most 
liberal member of the court, was a dissenter, while Justice Quince, who was a Jeb Bush 
appointee, voted with the majority.
The reaction of the nation was utter shock – some outrage and some joy, but 
above all, shock.  Conservative pundits were in arms; House Majority Whip declared, 
“This judicial aggression will not stand.225  Commentators who had interpreted the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s earlier decision as a warning signal to the Florida Supreme Court were 
in awe of the Florida Court’s audacity.  Moreover, these commentators believed that the 
U.S. Supreme Court was now in a compromising position – it either needed to shut 
down the recount now, or undo the public results if Gore took the lead over the 
weekend.226
The case was then remanded back to Judge Sauls, who recused himself; so 
Judge Lewis was selected to set a process for the manual recount.  Lewis too refused 
to provide a standard for the recounts other than “voter intent.”  Florida counties with all-
Republican canvassing boards were noticeably distressed, claiming that on most 
undervotes they could not discern the intent of the voter.  Some counties did not even 
have the undervotes separated.  The Bush team requested an emergency injunction to 
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halt the recounts, but the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals denied the request.  As 
Justice Wells had ominously forewarned, the state was in chaos.
Bush v. Gore
The chaos did not last long.  On Saturday, December 9, the United States 
Supreme Court issued an emergency injunction ordering a halt to the hand recounts by 
a narrow margin of 5 to 4.  The justices agreed to hear the case on Monday, December 
11 – only one day earlier before the deadline that had been recognized all along by both 
sides to certify the electors, December 12.  The Bush side had petitioned the injunction, 
citing the now all-too-familiar argument that hand recounts were arbitrary and 
discriminatory; moreover, the Bush team had to demonstrate that its candidate would be 
“irreparably harmed” if the recounts were to proceed while the case was reexamined.227
The emergency injunction looked like the end for Al Gore, even before the case 
was heard by the Supreme Court.  The 5 to 4 decision to issue the injunction stank of 
partisan motive to Gore supporters, as the five conservative justices sided against the 
four moderate/liberals.  Senator Bob Kerrey of Nebraska, a Democrat, pointed out that 
“[The Rehnquist court] has established in case after case the principle of state 
sovereignty.  It’s going to put them at odds with their own conclusions in the big 
Federalism case that’s going on.”228  Additionally, even if the recount was upheld, it was 
likely that there would not be enough time to complete it.
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote the dissenting opinion, which focused on three 
principles that he believed the order had violated: first, respect for rulings by state courts 
on questions of state law; second, the careful exercise of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
jurisdiction on matters that concern other branches of government; and third, he did not 
believe that George W. Bush’s claim did not constitute irreparable harm.229  He wrote:
“Counting every legally cast vote cannot constitute 
irreparable harm.  On the other hand, there is a danger that 
a stay may cause irreparable harm to the respondents – and 
more importantly, the public at large – because of the risk 
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that ‘the entry of the stay would be tantamount to a decision 
on the merits in favor of the applicants.’  Preventing the 
recount from being completed will inevitably cast a cloud on 
the legitimacy of the election.”230
In a rare move, Justice Scalia felt obliged to write a public explanation of the majority 
opinion.  In his explanation, he focused upon the claim of irreparable harm:
“On the question of irreparable harm…a few words are 
appropriate…One of the principal issues in the appeal we 
have accepted is precisely whether that votes have been 
ordered to be counted are, under reasonable interpretation 
of Florida law, ‘legally cast votes.’  The counting of votes that 
are of questionable legality does in my view threaten 
irreparable harm to petitioner, and to the country, by casting 
a cloud upon what he claims to be the legitimacy of his 
election.”231
Effectively, Scalia was stating that if the recounts proceeded and appeared to make 
Gore the winner by the time the court could decide on the Bush appeal, the Bush 
position would be unsound as a political matter even if it prevailed as a matter of law.232
The tables had turned once again, and the reaction was predictable: outrage 
from the Gore supporters, jubilation from the Bush supporters, and a collective eye roll 
by the American public.  Gore lawyer David Boies accused Scalia of “[not wanting] to 
have the legitimacy of [a potential Bush] presidency undercut by the fact that people will 
know there were more votes for Vice President Gore.”233  Liberal commentators 
portrayed the Court’s conservatives as being “hellbent on putting Bush in the White 
House.”234  Conservatives praised the decision, indicating their support of judicial 
regulation of the “activist” Florida Supreme Court.
The hearing was to begin at 11 am on December 11th.  Bush was represented by 
Theodore Olsen, and Gore by David Boies.  Each was questioned separately by the 
entire nine-member Supreme Court, with the focus on what should count as a legal vote 
in Florida, the Florida Supreme Court creating “new law” with its decision, and the Bush 
equal protection argument.  Observers of the hearing commented that the questions 
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asked by the justices revealed a resolute immobility from their previous positions.  For 
example, the “liberal bloc” tended to pry Boies on how the vote-counting would proceed, 
whereas the “conservative bloc” did not seem at all interested in this topic.  Bush 
supporters had indicated some nervousness about Justice Kennedy, who was the 
somewhat unreliable fifth member of the conservative bloc, but Kennedy showed few 
signs of reversing his position at the hearing.
The decision was handed down by the Court the following day.  In a 5 to 4 
opinion split down the same line as the injunction order, the Court reversed the Florida 
Supreme Court and ordered the recounts to end.  They concluded that the Florida 
Supreme Court’s decision had violated the equal protection clause, with two dissenting 
justices (Breyer and Souter) also agreeing that the varying standards in different Florida 
counties presented constitutional problems.235  Three of the seven (Rehnquist, Scalia, 
and Thomas) also argued that the Florida Supreme Court had violated Article 2 of the 
Constitution that requires legislatures to choose the manner for selecting electors.236  All 
five members of the majority agreed that there was no way to produce a timely remedy 
for the election.237  Interestingly, the majority stated in their opinion that Bush v. Gore
was not to be interpreted as a precedent.
Each of the dissenting justices (Stevens, Breyer, Souter, and Ginsburg) wrote 
his/her own dissenting opinion in addition to signing all or parts of others.  Unlike the 
two majority opinions, the dissenting opinions addressed many issues, from Breyer’s 
declaration that “The Court was wrong to take this case” to Stevens’s warning that 
“Preventing the recount from being completed will inevitably cast a cloud on the 
legitimacy of this election.”238 Justice Souter attempted to explain his position on the 
constitutionality of the Florida Supreme Court decision: although he recognized 
constitutional problems with the Florida Supreme Court’s ruling, he did not see any 
legitimate basis for the U.S. Supreme Court to try and solve it.  He, along with Justice 
Breyer, had offered to send the case back to the Florida court with instructions to 
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establish a uniform standard for counting the ballots.239  Neither Breyer nor Souter 
agreed with the majority’s opinion that the state of Florida could not comply with the 
recount by the day the electors met (December 18).  In his own opinion, Justice Breyer 
recalled the disputed election of 1876 and the creation of the Electoral Count Act to 
remedy future presidential disputes.  “The lesson that Congress learned in the election 
of 1876,” he said, was that “in this highly politicized matter, the appearance of a split 
decision runs the risk of undermining the public’s confidence in the Court itself.”240
Justice Ginsburg, unlike Souter and Breyer, disagreed entirely with the majority opinion 
– she did not believe the Florida recount raised any equal protection concerns.  She 
clearly indicated her distaste for the result of the case by ending her opinion with “I 
dissent” rather than the customary “I respectfully dissent.”  The final dissent, Justice 
Stevens’s dissent, focused on defeating the equal protections argument; he indicated 
that the equal protections constitutional provision had never before been used to call 
into question the traditional practice of manually recounting ballots.241  Instead, the 
majority “effectively orders the disenfranchisement of an unknown number of voters 
whose ballots reveal their intent – and are therefore legal votes under state law – but 
were for some reason rejected by ballot-counting machines.”242
The next day – day thirty-six of the post-election campaign – Vice President Al 
Gore finally conceded.  In a gracious eight minute speech, he told the American public 
that although he disagreed with the Supreme Court decision, “partisan rancor must now 
be put aside.”243  He declared that he would “honor the new president-elect and do 
everything possible to help him bring Americans together.”244  George W. Bush also 
spoke on December 13, stating that the “nation must rise above a house divided.”245  He 
also said, “I was not elected to serve one party, but to serve one nation.  Whether you 
voted for me or not, I will do my best to serve your interests and I will work to earn your 
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respect.”246  Thirty-six days and several of lawsuits later, the presidential election of 
2000 was finally over.
The Aftermath of Bush v. Gore
Debate over the merits of Bush v. Gore would continue well into the next year by 
both proponents and opponents.  To opponents, the U.S. Supreme Court was the 
obvious villain: the five members of the conservative majority were partisan hacks who 
made a decision consistent with their political preferences but inconsistent with 
precedent and with what would have been predicted of them given their views in other 
cases.247  Some even go as far to say that the majority would have ruled differently had 
Al Gore been leading in the Florida vote and Bush had been the candidate demanding 
manual recounts.248  On the other hand, the proponents of Bush v. Gore commend the
decision for its curtailment of judicial activism by the partisan Florida Supreme Court.  
Bush had consistently been declared the winner in the count on election night and the 
automatic recounts, it was clear to them that Al Gore was attempting to locate enough 
votes to overtake Bush, and he didn’t seem to be stopping at anything.
Bush v. Gore – an Odious Decision: On January 13, 2001, the following statement 
appeared in the New York Times:
“By stopping the vote count in Florida, the U.S. Supreme 
Court used its power to act as political partisans, not judges 
of a court of law.
We are Professors of Law at 120 American law schools, 
from every part of our country, of different political beliefs.  
But we all agree that when a bare majority of the U.S. 
Supreme Court halted the recount of ballots under Florida 
law, the five Justices were acting as political proponents for 
candidate Bush, not as judges.
It is not the job of a Federal Court to stop votes from being 
counted.
By stopping the recount in the middle, the five Justices acted 
to suppress the facts.  Justice Scalia argued that the justices 
had to interfere even before the Supreme Court heard the 
Bush team’s arguments because the recount might ‘cast a 
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cloud upon what [Bush] claims to be the legitimacy of his 
election.’  In other words, the conservative justices moved to 
avoid the ‘threat’ that Americans might learn that in the 
recount, Gore got more votes than Bush.  This is presumably 
‘irreparable’ harm because if the recount proceeded and the 
truth once became known, it would never again be possible 
to completely obscure the facts.  But it is not the job of the 
courts to polish the image of legitimacy of the Bush 
presidency by preventing disturbing facts from being 
confirmed.  Suppressing the facts to make the Bush 
government seem more legitimate is the job of 
propagandists, not judges.
By taking power from the voters, the Supreme Court has 
tarnished its own legitimacy.  As teachers whose lives have 
been dedicated to the rule of law, we protest.”249
The statement was signed by 554 law teachers from 120 schools.  Obviously, the U.S. 
Supreme Court had made a foe of many law professors.  “How can I convince my law 
students now that the integrity of legal reasoning matters?” groaned a law professor 
after he had read the per curium opinion of Bush v. Gore.250  This was the quintessential 
problem of Bush v. Gore according to law professors: not that the Court intervened in 
politics, but that the majority’s decision was so unconvincing.251
Aside from accusing the Court of acting as Republicans rather than jurists in 
deciding the issues of the election, these law professors contended that the stay itself 
was an egregious act of interference with the political process.  Legally, the notion of 
“irreparable harm” was designed as an extraordinary remedy for emergencies of the 
kind where someone’s life is in danger, the professors said.252  Moreover, the federal 
courts are not supposed to interfere with state sovereignty unless the state violates 
federal law or the Constitution – a fact that these particular judges had strenuously 
upheld during their tenures.253  In essence, the law professors believed that the U.S. 
Supreme Court never should have been involved at all with the election, and they 
dismissed Justices Rehnquist, Thomas, and Scalia’s concurring opinion that alleged 
constitutional violations.
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The equal protections argument, however, received by far the most scrutiny by 
Bush v. Gore opponents.  First, they argue that the first review of Gore v. Harris by the 
Supreme Court was sent back to the Florida Supreme Court without any hint of an 
equal protections problem, which could have been resolved at that time.254  They argue 
that the disclaimer that Bush v. Gore was not to be a precedent was present because 
equal protections claim was exceptionally weak.  Hand counts of the vote clearly 
produces a risk of treating voters inconsistently, but this has never been shown to a 
violation of the equal protections clause.255 Furthermore, basing the opinion on equal 
protection seems severely inconsistent with the drastic disparities in vote tabulation 
procedures that characterize virtually all contemporary elections.256
The weakness of the equal protections argument was to be derived by 
opponents as the justices interpreting the clause differently than it was conventionally 
treated.  Fairness, the opponents contend, does not require that the government treat 
all citizens in exactly the same way in all circumstances.257 Fairness does require, 
however, that citizens not be disadvantaged.  In fact, different cities within any particular 
state inevitably adopt very different election laws.  Since these existing election laws 
inherently will vary from city to city within a particular state, this means that the initial 
vote- counting procedures also varied within the state.  The fact that alarming rates of 
ballot spoilage on Election Night came from largely African American precincts due to 
cheaper machines, then, should also be a violation of the equal protections clause, 
opponents contended.  Their point was, however, that since different systems were 
utilized to count the initial vote and therefore different standards of vote-counting 
applied (e.g. optical scanning machines which were less prone to error versus punch 
card ballots that were very prone to error), then why was it so essential to develop a 
uniform standard of vote tabulation in the recounts?  Furthermore, the well-publicized 
New York Times investigations of anomalies in Florida revealed that heavily Republican 
counties were more likely to stretch the rules; for example, allowing absentee ballots 
that were postmarked after Election Day, whereas this rule was strictly enforced in 
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heavily Democratic Counties.258 This begs the question: if the rules were to be 
stretched in one county, then why could they not be stretched in all of them?
The final subject of Bush v. Gore criticism is the majority’s claim that the counting 
of the votes had to stop because there was insufficient time to establish acceptable 
recounting rules and still complete the count by December 12, 2000.259  As a 
Washington Post commentator put it:
“Once they got into it, the justices realized they really didn’t 
have the ‘federal question’ that would justify their meddling.  
But the majority fell right into the Bush strategy of delaying 
until the new deadline was almost upon them.  Then, in their 
late-night decision, they groaned, ‘Oh, dear, where did the 
time go?’”260
The December 12 deadline had originated when the Chief Justice Charles T. Wells of 
the Florida Supreme Court had asked Gore lawyer David Boies on November 20 if he 
thought that the battles over the Florida vote would have to be determined by December 
12.261  Boies had responded, “I do, your honor.”  Other than that, the December 12 date 
was essentially arbitrary – but the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the deadline in an 
apparent deference to the Florida Supreme Court.  This deference was seen has 
extremely ironic to Gore supporters, as the U.S. Supreme Court had refused to defer to 
the Florida Supreme Court on any other point in the controversy.262  Moreover, this 
alleged deference was misguided in the first place – the Florida Supreme Court had not 
explicitly defined a deadline in its ruling, other than the meeting of the Electoral College 
on December 18.  As Yale Law Professor Jed Rubenfeld so succinctly put it, “There 
was no December 12 deadline.  The majority made it up.  On this pretense, the 
presidential election was determined.”263
Bush v. Gore – A Celebrated Decision: With the entire state of Florida in the 
midst of recount chaos and a state legislature threatening to send its own slate of 
electors to the Electoral College, there was a very real constitutional crisis looming if the 
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Supreme Court had not decided in Bush’s favor.  The defenders of Bush v. Gore
maintained that the judges in the majority did not act in a partisan or self-serving way, 
but rather for stability and order – behavior that does have precedent.264  Others, mostly 
conservative pundits, insisted on assuring the public that the equal protections defense 
does in fact hold weight.  Still others, mostly conservative law professors, agreed that 
the equal protections claim was exceptionally weak, but that Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, 
and Thomas’s opinion of constitutional violations held much weight.
The first defense – that Bush v. Gore prevented a constitutional crisis and 
resulting chaos – is by far the most widely approved defense.  This defense is rooted in 
the notion that the Supreme Court was in fact the correct avenue to settle the 2000 
election dispute (rather than through Congress and the Electoral Counts Act).  It goes 
on to say that the current Supreme Court – particularly the five justices in the majority –
have consistently acted as if the greatest threat was that democracy would become too 
unstructured and too excessive.265  Therefore, the Court’s decision was not “partisan 
hackery,” but rather a preference for order.  The failure to intervene might have 
precipitated a constitutional crisis, a crisis that could precipitate divisions in the 
American public not seen since the Civil War.  A crisis of this magnitude would certainly 
mar the U.S.’s role in the world as well as the next president’s authority, whether it
would be Bush or Gore.   Chief Justice Rehnquist defended this position himself in 
Centennial Crisis, his book on the similarly disputed election of 1876, when he wrote: 
“[The justices who served on the Electoral Commission] may 
have tarnished the reputation of the Court, but they may also 
have saved the nation from, if not widespread violence, a 
situation fraught with combustible uncertainty.  In the view of 
this author, in accepting membership on the Commission, 
they did the right thing.”266
The second defense, mostly attributed to conservative pundits, sustained the 
equal protections defense as solid.  These pundits decried the recounts in general, 
alleging that U.S. Supreme Court was merely curtailing the Florida Supreme Court’s 
disturbing display of judicial activism.  The decision, they said, rested on a simple 
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premise: if there is going to be a manual recount, it should be conducted properly.267
The pundits stressed that the vote on this issue was actually 7-2, since Justices Breyer 
and Souter had both agreed that the varying standards presented constitutional 
problems.  They assert that the manual recounts should not have been conducted at all; 
for in Florida’s election code, it states that only “legal votes” may be counted – and a 
“legal vote” is one that was in compliance with the clear voting instructions.268
The final defense showcases the separate majority opinion offered by Justices 
Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas that accused the Florida Supreme Court of violation of 
Article II, Section I, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution, which states: “Each state shall 
appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature Thereof May Direct,” the offices of President 
and Vice President.269  These defenders, mostly constitutional law professors, maintain 
that “the litigation phase of the 2000 election was not carried out in accordance with the 
substantive or procedural provisions of Florida’s election law.”270  This argument runs 
parallel with the Bush team argument that the Florida Supreme Court had created “new 
law” with its ruling, and therefore violated Florida statutes.  They charge that the Florida 
Supreme Court created its own electoral scheme that substituted judicial authority for 
that of the secretary of state.271
The Miami Herald Performs Its Own Recount: No sooner had Gore conceded 
when several newspapers, most notably the Miami Herald, decided to perform their own
recount to settle who really won the election.  They inspected 64,248 undervote ballots, 
which was the focus of the Gore recount campaign, and the results were quite shocking.  
Their first conclusion was that “Bush almost certainly would have won the presidential 
election even if the U.S. Supreme Court had not halted the statewide recount of 
undervotes ordered by the Florida Supreme Court.”272  This result was based on 
recounts designed along two standards: the inclusive standard advocated by the Gore 
team and the strict standard advocated by the Bush team.  It must be noted that in its 
ruling the Florida Supreme Court specifically excluded from the statewide recount 
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Broward, Palm Beach, Volusia, and 139 precincts in Miami-Dade where manual 
recounts had already been conducted.273 Ironically, using the inclusive standard 
encouraged by Gore’s lawyers actually added 1,128 votes to his official 537-vote lead, 
totaling, 1,665.274  Using the strict standard, Bush’s lead diminished to 363 if only 
hanging chads were counted and it would have vanished completely to a Gore win by 
only three votes if only clean punches were accepted.275  However, if consistent 
standards had been used in Broward and Palm Beach Counties allowing the counts to 
proceed the entire time under the inclusive standard, Gore would have been credited 
another 2,022 votes – making him the winner.276
A similar inspection of the Florida overvotes (which totaled 110,000 – about one 
of every fifty voters), though not requested by either Bush or Gore during the post-
election period, revealed that Gore was undoubtedly harmed more by invalidation of the 
overvotes.  In Palm Beach County alone, 5,264 votes were for Gore and Buchanan, 
2,862 for Gore and Socialist McReynolds, and 1,319 for Gore and Libertarian 
Browne.277  Statistical studies show that most of these votes were intended for Gore, 
but voters were confused by the butterfly ballot.  Confusing ballot design was not a 
feature of Palm Beach County alone; this problem plagued several counties - most 
notoriously Volusia and Duval Counties – but it was determined in many cases that the 
overvote problem correlated directly to a county’s wealth and literacy rate.278
The chief result of the Miami Herald examination was this: “If Florida law had 
clearly mandated a manual examination of all machine-rejected ballots between 
Election Day and official certification of the election, thousands of additional votes would 
have been salvaged and the outcome of the election might have been different.”279  In 
its examination of the overvotes, it concluded that legally most of these votes were lost 
forever, but a good portion could have been recovered as legal votes.  For example, in 
counties that used optical scanning voting equipment, some people voted for Gore and 
then again for his running mate Lieberman, and the same thing happened with Bush 
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and Cheney.280  Throughout the state, many people voted for Bush or Gore – and then 
did so again in the write-in category.281  Many people also did not vote for Gore or Bush 
in its proper place on the ballot, and instead wrote in Gore or Bush in the write-in 
category.  It is clear from these studies that hundreds, if not thousands, of votes with 
determinable “voter intent” could have been recovered by manual statewide 
examination of the undervotes and overvotes together.
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Chapter 5: The Presidency of George W. Bush
George W. Bush was inaugurated as the forty-third president of the United States 
on January 20, 2001 by Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court William Rehnquist, 
which many Democrats found to be ironic.  Only a month and a week had passed since 
the tumultuous election had finally drawn to a close, and the demonstrations at his 
inauguration proved that tensions still had not calmed.  Just days before his 
inauguration, a Zogby poll put his approval rating at just 42% – he was obviously going 
to have to earn the trust of the American people, particularly those who did not believe 
he was the rightful president.282
But Bush did not govern in the careful and deliberate manner that many 
commentators believed was necessary to earn the trust of the American people after 
the disputed election.  Instead, in a move that some resented but others deemed
brilliant, Bush governed from the beginning as if he had a clear mandate from the public 
for his strongly conservative economic, domestic, and foreign policy agenda.283  He 
chose his cabinet quickly in order to be able to “hit the ground running” – a strategy that 
would help him to avoid missteps of the early Clinton administration and alleviate the 
skepticism over his ability to govern.284  He also decided to push the issues of his 
campaign early in his presidency – especially his tax cut.  Remarkably, he was 
successful in this endeavor, implementing a $1.3 trillion tax cut with the support of many 
Senate Democrats.  Titled the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 
2001, the legislation effectively lowered tax rates and simplified retirement and qualified 
plan rules.285 However, the Democrats – who were the majority party after May 2001 
when Vermont Republican James Jeffords defected – were largely able to block the 
Bush domestic agenda during the spring and summer of 2001.286  At that point, it looked 
as if the Bush presidency would be characterized as highly partisan and would consist 
282
 Zogby Poll, 
http://www.peaceredding.org/Bush's%20Approval%20Ratings%20Continue%20to%20Fall.htm (accessed 
3 April 2005).
283
 Schier 2004, 17.
284
 Greg and Rozell, 38.
285
 Wikipedia Encyclopedia, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economic_Growth_and_Tax_Relief_Reconciliation_Act_of_2001 (accessed 3 
April 2005).
286
 Schier 2004, 27.
84
of legislative gridlock.287  His poll numbers had remained solid at first as people who 
had relatively low expectations of him at first were pleasantly surprised at his ability to 
govern, but as the summer of 2001 passed and people were becoming less enchanted 
with his performance as president.  His approval rating after his first hundred days in 
office on August 27, 2001 according to Zogby was 50% positive and 49% negative.288
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington, 
D.C. were devastating to the country, but offered unique circumstances and 
opportunities for President Bush.  That night, he declared America’s response to the 
crisis would be a “war on terror,” and the result was a soaring approval rating of 85%, 
up from 50% on September 10 – some of which was motivated by patriotism, but most 
of which was true respect for the president.  Congress, which had been characterized 
by partisan split during the spring and summers of 2001, saw that it was in its best 
interests to unite in order to tackle the new policy agenda of terrorism, defense, and 
foreign relations – which certainly contributed to the good image of the Bush 
administration.  Congress passed resolutions giving President Bush the authority to 
proceed with military action, without the declaration of war that the Constitution 
requires.289  The war on terror would be the dominating feature of Bush’s first term.
On October 8, 2001, President Bush announced the first executive-level office to 
be created since 1988, the Office of Homeland Security, to be headed by former 
Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge.290 The goal of the Office of Homeland Security 
was, "to develop and coordinate the implementation of a comprehensive national 
strategy," and, "to secure the United States from terrorist threats or attacks."  On March 
12, 2002, the Department of Homeland Security unveiled the Homeland Security 
Advisory System, which was “a color-coded scale created to illustrate the probable level 
of threat currently posed by terrorists, based on various intelligence reports.”291
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A second feature of Bush’s response to the terrorism was the Patriot Act, which 
sailed through Congress (357-66 in the House, 98-1 in the Senate) in October of 2001.  
In recognition of a wartime environment, the Patriot Act tightened domestic security 
measures.  According to Peri Arnold, Government professor at Notre Dame University,
“[The Patriot Act] expanded the powers of federal agencies 
in domestic surveillance and internal security actions.  It 
expanded the capacities of those agencies to gain 
information about individuals’ choices and communications 
from libraries, Internet service providers and retail 
merchants.  And it expanded the activities that could be 
covered by the legal definition of terrorism and gave U.S. 
foreign intelligence agencies freedom to conduct domestic 
intelligence activities.”292
Although the Patriot Act had received huge support in Congress, it eventually became a 
controversial subject with the public as citizens were denied due process rights.  
However, it certainly had public support at the time of its passage because most 
Americans felt safer because of the president’s exapnded powers in domestic 
security.293
The final feature of Bush’s initial response to the September 11th attacks was the 
deployment of 11,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan and aerial bombings that commenced 
on October 7, 2001, or Operation Enduring Freedom. Operation Enduring Freedom was 
not a unilateral action by the U.S., it was supported by the United Kingdom and the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance.  The goal of the invasion was to 
overthrow the Taliban government of Afghanistan, an Islamic fundamentalist group 
which was thought to be harboring Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda.294 The Taliban 
had fallen by mid-November, and by December 20, 2001 the United Nations Secutiy 
Council authorized “the deployment of a peacekeeping force to provide stability for the 
Afghan interim government.”295
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The war on terror, however, did not prevent President Bush from completing 
important features of his domestic agenda from the previous year.  On January 8, 2002, 
after nearly a year of negotiations in Congress, he signed into law the “No Child Left 
Behind Act of 2001,” a six-year reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act first passed in 1965.296 No Child Left Behind kept intact the highly 
complex structure of federal education policy, and made modest reforms of the 
Governor Bush model in Texas.  The act’s goal was improvement in the performance of 
America's primary and secondary schools, to be achieved by expanding the standards 
of accountability for states, school districts, and schools, as well as providing parents 
more flexibility in choosing which schools their children will attend.297  The No Child Left 
Behind Act in its final version garnered wide and bipartisan support from Congress, 
passing 381 to 41 in the House and 87 to 10 in the Senate.
After the election of 2000, many believed that the Republicans would suffer in the 
2002 midterm elections.  However, the combination of September 11th and Bush’s 
strategy of active campaigning for the midterm elections made the public forget the 
irritation of the last election and instead yielded remarkable results for the Republicans: 
a gain of six seats in the House and two in the Senate, giving them majority status in 
both.  These results were absolutely historic, for it was the first time in over a century 
that a president’s party had regained control of the Senate in a midterm election, and it 
was the first election since 1934 in which the president’s party gained seats in both 
houses of Congress in a first-term midterm election.298  Moreover, it marked an end to 
the previous eight years of divided government, since Republicans now controlled all 
three branches.
Although these domestic successes were important, Bush’s foreign policy, 
particularly the war on terror, overshadowed virtually everything else.  In his 2002 State 
of the Union Address, he unveiled the Bush post-September 11 foreign policy:
“Our second goal is to prevent regimes that sponsor terror 
from threatening America or our friends and allies with 
weapons of mass destruction…Iraq continues to flaunt its 
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hostility toward America and to support terror. The Iraqi 
regime has plotted to develop anthrax and nerve gas and 
nuclear weapons for over a decade. This is a regime that 
has already used poison gas to murder thousands of its own 
citizens, leaving the bodies of mothers huddled over their 
dead children. This is a regime that agreed to international 
inspections then kicked out the inspectors. This is a regime 
that has something to hide from the civilized world. 
States like [North Korea, Iran, and Iraq], and their terrorist 
allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace 
of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these 
regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could 
provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to 
match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to 
blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price 
of indifference would be catastrophic.”299
This policy would later evolve into the Bush Doctrine in the fall of 2002, which consisted 
of four main elements: first, a policy of preemptive war; second, the right to unilateral 
military action; third, a policy of U.S. military superiority; and fourth, a policy promoting 
democracy and freedom everywhere in the world.300  The Bush Doctrine would be put 
into practice beginning in March of 2003 with Operation Iraqi Freedom, a preemptive 
war waged by the U.S. and a “coalition of the willing” to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s 
dictatorship.
The Iraq War would become Bush’s most controversial action of his first term and 
consequently a catalyst that would simultaneously undo his high approval ratings and 
divide the nation.  Bush would base his claim on the necessity for preemptive war with 
Iraq on the presence of chemical and nuclear weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in 
the country and the character of dictator Saddam Hussein has always been a nuisance 
but was downright threatening in possession of WMDs.
The Iraq war was and continues to be controversial on several levels.  First, Bush 
was attacking a country that had never attacked or threatened to attack the United 
States.  Second, the Iraq War had not received UN support nor the multilateral support 
of the Persian Gulf War in 1991 – it was essentially the United States and the British 
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fighting alone, because the “coalition of the willing” included rather small and weak 
countries that could not provide much assistance.  Moreover, Bush had not asked for a 
congressional declaration of war, which critics assert stank of the Tonkin Gulf memory.  
Third, President Bush was accused of using the September 11 attacks as an excuse to 
finish off Saddam Hussein – for he had publicly criticized his father for not “finishing the 
job” after the Persian Gulf War – even though there were virtually no ties between Al 
Qaeda and Saddam Hussein.  Fourth, the Iraq War has caused severe tension with 
traditional U.S. Allies, such as France, Germany, and Europe in general, and has in has 
inhibited the U.S.’s moral position in the world.  Fifth, the Iraq Survey Group concluded 
in January of 2005 that there were no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, severely 
damaging public trust in the president.  Finally, “Mission Accomplished” was declared in 
May of 2003, less than two months after the war commenced, and it has been two years 
to date and the fighting in Iraq continues. Nevertheless, Bush has had success with the 
Iraq War.  After all, his objective was achieved : the Iraqi government has been 
overthrown and Saddam Hussein has been taken into custody.  The Iraq War would 
prove to be a huge issue in the election of 2004.
After the capture of Saddam Hussein in December 2003, many thought that Bush 
had also captured reelection for 2004.  Yet, in January of 2004, a full eight months since 
the infamous “Mission accomplished” and a month after the capture of Hussein, his 
approval ratings were back down at 50%.  Maybe the country was polarized enough 
after all to deny Bush reelection.  Perhaps the memories of 2000 would return to haunt 
him at last, with September 11th three years removed and therefore less capable of 
distracting the people.
2000, however, did not return to haunt Bush’s chances of success at reelection, 
even th rough Democrats calls for voters to “redefeat” Bush.  The Democratic challenger 
was Massachusetts junior Senator John Kerry, an honorable but dull opponent.  Kerry 
challenged Bush on his conservative domestic policies, the war in Iraq, the 
environment, and the economy.  Bush in turn accused Kerry of “flip flopping” on the 
issues, most notably the war in Iraq.  He stressed his record in the aftermath of 
September 11th, and promised to keep America safe from terrorism.  He promoted 
virtually the same domestic platform as 2000 and characterized himself as Ronald 
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Reagan’s heir.  Though the campaign was close and bitterly fought towards the end, 
Bush ultimately prevailed – indisputably, this time, winning Florida by 400,000 and the 
ultimate battleground state of Ohio by 119,000 as well as the popular vote by four 
million.  He won the Electoral College 286 to Kerry’s 252, and Kerry conceded the day 
after Election Day.
Conclusions
When George W. Bush was effectively handed the presidency by five Supreme 
Court justices, many commentators speculated that the Republicans could be in for 
trouble in the midterm elections of 2002 and the presidential election of 2004.  Yet, the 
opposite occurred – the Republicans actually prevailed in both elections.  Many 
wondered how the legacy of the 2000 proved to be so short lived – and the answer 
certainly lies in the extraordinary event of September 11th and Bush’s brilliant strategy 
team.
Although September 11th was by far the most tragic event of modern U.S. history, 
it was also the miracle revival drug for President George W. Bush.  It allowed Bush to 
step up and shine in an area where initial standards of him were low.  It was a tragedy 
that gripped every home in the country, and sparked the realization that maybe we as 
Americans are not so different after all.  This, in turn, restored enormous support into 
American government, and consequently the Bush presidency.  He was able to utilize 
his own support by filtering it into the Republican Party, which could later claim the 
success of his administration.  September 11th was also an opportunity for him to delve 
into foreign policy, under the guise of keeping Americans safe – and quite possibly 
securing his reelection, since Americans have historically never changed 
administrations during wartime.
Yet, one cannot ignore his brilliant – or perhaps lucky – strategy when answering 
the question of Bush’s political success.  Although it is debatable to whether Bush’s 
strategy would have worked without the event of September 11th, one has to admire his 
team’s perseverance.  Instead of acknowledging his weak claim to the presidency and 
setting out on a moderate path, he instead ignored his route to the presidency and 
governed as if he were given a mandate.  This allowed him and his party to taste 
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success with their agenda very early in his presidency, and not to be guilty of the 
stalemate of the honeymoon period.  After his success dealing with the terrorist attacks 
of September 11th, he was able to consolidate and prolong his support through the 
midterm elections.  Furthermore, he engaged himself in the previous no-no of 
intervening in Congressional midterm elections and defied history when his party took 
back the Senate.  Finally, he campaigned vigorously for his reelection and presented 
himself – and his same policies – to the American people once again with four years of 
experience in the nation’s top job, and the American people decided that it was okay if 
he stayed.
The legacy of the 2000 election, however, has not completely faded away.  It 
reminded the American people that every vote does indeed count, and consequently the 
2004 election had the highest voter turnout in years.  Moreover, it cast an enduring 
shadow on the American political process, which has led many to question whether the 
Electoral College is in need of replacement given its inherent bias towards small states.  
And most importantly, the division that occurred in the American public after the 2000 
election has become even sharper after a brief interlude of apparent unity following 
September 11th as the Republicans become more conservative and the moderates and 
liberals stagnate.  This division is concentrated in the ongoing legacy of President 
George W. Bush – 51% of the population voted for him in 2004, but one has to 
remember that 48% also voted against him, and a majority of that 48% deemed another 
four years of his presidency as intolerable.
Nevertheless, the moral of the story is that the 2000 election has largely been 
overshadowed by September 11th.  Bush v. Gore – though still a disturbing decision to 
most constitutional law scholars – has largely been granted the same fate, tucked away 
neatly in the pre-September 11th world.  It is impossible to say how Bush’s presidency 
would have turned out had it not been for September 11th, which radically altered the 
course of American history.  
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Chapter 4: Conclusions
The elections of 1876 and 2000 demonstrate both a criticism and a 
commendation of American constitutionalism: first, the American system is not perfect; 
and second, however imperfect the system may be, it will ALWAYS yield a result that 
will be accepted as legitimate.  It is generally regarded that the commendation takes 
priority over the criticism, because it is impossible to achieve perfection in an imperfect 
world and the stability of a political system is founded on the public’s ability to accept 
the results of political processes.  Although hotly contested at the time, the elections of 
1876 and 2000 represent only two cases of deadlock out of a total of fifty-four elections 
held in U.S. history.  The point is, then, that the American constitutional system is 
capable of breakdown, but these breakdowns occur infrequently and are always 
resolved within the confines of the existing system.  And the occurrence of these 
breakdowns is not all necessarily bad, as it imposes an education of the Constitution 
and electoral procedures on a largely ignorant American public.
The legitimacy of the presidents resulting from the elections of 1876 and 2000 –
Rutherford B. Hayes and George W. Bush – cannot be disputed.  Even some of the 
most vehement opponents of the two elections’ results accepted the outcomes, even if 
only indicated by a tacit reference to “President Hayes” or “President Bush.”  
Furthermore, there were no riot-like efforts to install either of the losing candidates by 
force.  This legitimacy is reinforced by the fact that the controversial nature of the two 
elections was virtually forgotten within six months of inauguration, let alone four years 
later.  There is no evidence that demonstrates that the elections of 1880 or 2004 were 
affected at all by the immediately previous elections – in fact, another Republican, 
James A. Garfield (who was incidentally an instrumental figure in the election of 1876), 
won the election of 1880 and George W. Bush was definitively reelected in 2004.
Since 124 years separated the two elections, difficulties arise when one attempts 
to analyze them together.  This becomes evident especially when one recognizes the 
huge shift in world status of the United States between the two elections as well as the 
technological differences.  The result of these two difficulties in addition to other more 
minor difficulties is that the fundamental meanings of the election’s outcomes are truly
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distinct.  Nevertheless, they will be analyzed separately first followed by a synthesis 
debate regarding the question of power in both elections.
The Election of 1876: The election of 1876 was the closest presidential election in 
American history, since the closest disputed state (Florida) declared Hayes the winner 
by only forty-three votes.  Yet, the election was largely forgotten by the American public 
by the year 2000 and its resulting president, Rutherford B. Hayes, classified with the 
likes of several other Gilded Age presidents that no one can remember.  With such an 
important civics lesson at stake, how could Americans have forgotten this landmark 
election?
The answer is: because the election of 1876 was not a landmark election.  The 
combination of its moral pretenses in complement to its bipartisan resolution exemplifies 
its consistency with usual American politics.  In essence, the election was not landmark 
because its resolution did not lead to any significant changes in the political process, 
nor did it ignite old Civil War tensions.  Business was as usual on March 5, 1877, with 
the exception of a few grumbling newspaper journalists.  This indicates the resilience 
and success of the American political system at a time when political tensions were 
sharper than usual.
If one were to simplify the election of 1876 into a recurring phrase, the two 
phrases that would dominate are “free and fair” and “illegal and false.”  The former is of 
course in reference to the questionable treatment of blacks in the three disputed 
southern states, and the latter is President Grant’s standard on how votes in the 
disputed states should be resolved.  The outcome of the election of 1876 dictates one 
premise: the elections in South Carolina, Louisiana, and Florida were not free and fair.  
This principle would ultimately guide the election’s resolution.  Even though the 
Republican and Democratic parties were of theoretical equal stature in 1876, it would 
not be inaccurate to claim that even through the scandalous Grant administration, the 
Republicans retained the moral upper hand as the victors of the Civil War.  Moreover, 
they still controlled the majority of the branches of government, including the carpetbag 
regimes still in place from Reconstruction.  The Democrats probably consciously or 
unconsciously knew that they could not fight to the death for their or man without risking 
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a second Civil War.  Therefore, it was difficult for them to dispute the Republican claim 
that the election was not “free and fair” and consisted of “illegal and false” returns.
One cannot ignore the importance of the Electoral Count Bill of 1877.  Here was 
a bill, sponsored by Democrats but approved by a Republican Senate and signed by a 
Republican president that systematically solved the problem of the disputed election.  It 
was an admirable bill because it recognized the extreme partisan nature of both the 
ballot-counting by the canvassing boards and the certification by election officials.
Although the Democrats decried the bill after Justice David Davis made it clear that he 
would not serve on the committee, the bill still prevailed as a law that had once been 
approved by both parties.  This solution is fitting for the time, given the preeminence of 
Congress during the Gilded Age.
The subsequent moderation of President Rutherford B. Hayes is also integral 
when assessing the legacy of the election of 1876.  Hayes was not an Old Guard 
candidate to begin with, but if he had pursued Old Guard-style policies in his term, he 
certainly would not have been tolerated by the Democrats.  In fact, it is likely that the 
Democrats were so conciliatory to Republicans towards the end of the post-election 
period because the candidate Hayes was tolerable to them.  Whether his moderation 
was inherent or whether it was specifically in response to the conditions of his election, 
it was ultimately an astute political choice given the circumstances.  Although Hayes is 
not remembered as one of the “great” presidents anyway, his legacy would have be 
considerably lower had he chosen to govern with a mandate.
The Election of 2000: Whereas the election of 1876 was largely about voter 
disenfranchisement, particularly that of blacks, the legacy of the 2000 election 
concentrates more on the limits of technology,  defining the appropriate venue to resolve 
election disputes, and the final resolution materialized through Bush v. Gore.  Since not 
much appeared to be at stake in 2000, a time of relative calm and prosperity, the debate 
of the election of 2000 is far more concentrated in the principles of the election instead 
of the candidates themselves.  Moreover, the September 11th terrorist attacks 
completely discount any feasible method of evaluating Bush’s performance as president 
in light of his perceived illegitimacy.
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The emphasis on technology must be acknowledged; in 1876, there were no 
ballot counting machines and the votes had to be counted by hand, while in 2000 one of 
the major debates was over whether a hand-count could be conducted objectively. The 
problem of 2000, as evidenced through the Miami Herald recounts, was that hundreds 
of legitimate votes were mistakenly thrown out by faulty machines.  These machines 
were arbitrarily penalizing voters, which could be especially problematic in counties 
whose voters are heavily Republican or Democratic.  This is demonstrated by the 
noticeably different levels of ballot spoilages in counties that use punch card ballots 
versus counties that use optical scanning, 4% and .5% respectively.  The use of punch 
card versus optical scanning equipment also corresponded with the wealth level of a 
given county – the richer counties tended to use optical scanning machines while the 
poorer counties tended to use punch card ballots. It also came to light that voting totals 
could change even after a machine recount – indicating that perhaps technology is not 
so infallible after all.  Thus, the election of 2000 proved that technology can be both 
faulty and discriminatory – the question remains, however, whether the alternative of 
manual recounts is much better.
The bigger question in the legacy of the election of 2000, however, is the 
judiciary’s preeminent role in determining the ultimate winner, and Bush v. Gore in 
particular.  The comparison between 1876 and 2000 is obvious: Congress produced a 
bill to settle the dispute in 1876 (which did ultimately involve a final decision made by a 
Supreme Court justice), whereas the election of 2000 was determined through the 
outcomes of several lawsuits.  Moreover, the 1876 debacle had produced legislation 
addressing future election disputes in the form of the Electoral Count Act of 1887, which 
essentially gives states – and the state legislatures in particular – the power to 
determine their electors.  With such a law already in place, why was the judicial system 
deemed the appropriate avenue in which to settle the election dispute?
Although cited by the Bush team in various arguments used in the contested 
election case, the Electoral Count Act of 1887 was never a major force in the election of 
2000.  Perhaps this is because its statutory remedies were always of questionable 
constitutionality, and thus territory the Bush team did not want to pursue.  Nevertheless, 
the Bush team chose to file a lawsuit within days of November 7th rather than to allow 
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the recounts, which were legal under Florida law, to continue.  The Gore team did the 
same, though indirectly through the plaintiffs of the butterfly ballot case.  This behavior 
of actively influencing the outcome of the election is in direct contrast to 1876, in which 
both candidates largely did nothing after the initiation of the election dispute.  This 
indicates the growing preeminence of the judiciary in the twentieth century as legitimate 
lawmakers.  
Going to court in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries is the 
accepted and common method in order to solve disputes, and it would indeed have 
seemed odd, if not arrogant, if Congress had taken it upon itself to resolve the dispute.  
After all, why should a body of presumably wealthy and powerful white men decide what 
to do with thousands of inconclusive Florida ballots? It seemed much more reasonable
(and in line with federalist principles) to keep the election as localized as possible, with 
only direction from federal/state courts.  Furthermore, the judiciary is regarded by most 
Americans as a politically impartial venue, whereas Congress’s partisanship is obvious.
Taking the 2000 election to court, then, seemed like the fairest method to the American 
people to resolve the election dispute at the time.
The problem, however, was that when the general perception of impartial judges 
began to unravel, solving the election dispute in the judiciary did not seem like such a 
good idea anymore – especially when Bush v. Gore yielded a seemingly partisan result.
The result of the election of 2000 was probably more frustrating than to Gore supporters 
in 2000 than Tilden supporters in 1876 because Democrats in 1876 had at least initially 
agreed to the Electoral Count Act of 1877, whereas in 2000 it seemed as if Bush allies 
were in all the key positions to determine the election’s outcome.  Nevertheless, it must 
be noted that the U.S. Supreme Court did not take a noticeable hit regarding public 
confidence, implying that most Americans did agree that it was the appropriate venue to 
resolve the election.
The final point of contention in the election of 2000 was Bush v. Gore itself.  
There is general agreement among law professors, judges, and pundits that Bush v. 
Gore is an incredibly weak case.  The Supreme Court majority itself even seems to 
imply its awareness of Bush v. Gore’s weakness by its preemptive clause that excludes 
Bush v. Gore from legal precedent.  The equal protections claim has been absolutely 
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decimated, and the alleged constitutional violation proposed by Justices Rehnquist, 
Scalia, and Thomas has not provided much more comfort to these scholars.  Yet, one 
cannot ignore the unstated but rock-solid defense of Bush v. Gore – that the justices 
were ending the recounts on the basis of upholding the dignity of the American system 
and preventing chaos.  It is difficult to even speculate what might have occurred had the 
recounts proceeded, much less how this would have impacted the election of 2004.
Thus, the likely ulterior motive of the conservative justices certainly cannot be easily 
dismissed, no matter how unfair the whole election may have seemed to some.
The Question of Power: The question of power debate is defined by the extent 
to which those in positions of authority with respect to presidential elections can 
influence the outcome of these elections when the results are disputed.  Since national 
and even state politics are characterized as overwhelmingly partisan (e.g., there are 
very few nonpartisan positions), it is assumed that most election officials are affiliated 
with a political party.  By analyzing the elections of 1876 and 2000, the answer seems to 
be that when certain positions are dominated by the same party, this party has much 
influence in determining the election’s outcome.  In 1876, the Republicans controlled the 
Senate, executive branch, and judicial branch on the national stage, as well as the 
canvassing boards and governorships of the disputed states.  The Democrats controlled 
only the House of Representatives.  In 2000, the Republicans controlled Congress, the 
U.S. Supreme Court, the executive branch of Florida, and the Florida Legislature.  The 
Democrats controlled the presidency and the Florida Supreme Court.  Clearly, the 
Republicans had the advantage in both cases.  The Republican advantage in 1876 was 
more concentrated on the state level – had there not been carpetbag Republican 
governors in South Carolina, Florida, and Louisiana in 1876 (who were all replaced by 
Democrats in that election), the states never would have been held in the first place.  
Moreover, Republican control of the canvassing boards was also integral, since it was 
the canvassing boards that determined what constituted a legal vote.  In the case of 
Oregon, the Democrat governor certified the results with the split electors (two 
Republican electors and one Democrat) rather than all three Hayes electors, even 
though the state had clearly gone to Hayes.  The Republican advantage at the state 
level was also essential in 2000, with a more minor role delegated to the U.S. Supreme 
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Court.  Had a Democrat been in the key position of Florida Secretary of State, the 
recounts certainly would have proceeded differently and perhaps the election reversed.
These correlations between election power positions and outcomes are hard to 
ignore.  They signify that the American democratic system in practice is far from ideal, 
and these biases are virtually impossible to eliminate or even control.  
The elections of 1876 and 2000 both serve as lessons to American citizens.  
Most generally, every vote does indeed count.  But more importantly, our American 
system is intriguing, complex, and – to some – outmoded, but it is also an incredibly 
steadfast system that will always produce results.  We may not agree with these results, 
but there will always be a legal justification for them.  And in the case of a disputed 
presidential bid, no matter who emerges as the victor, the nation will inevitably support 
him/her.  For we know that there will always be another election in four years, and that
is usually enough.
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Appendix I: Electoral Map of 1876 and Summary
From http://www.presidentelect.org/e1876.html
Figure 2: State by State Analysis in 1876
In 1876, 369 electoral votes were available; 185 votes were needed to secure the win.
STATE HAYES TILDEN COOPER OTHERS EVs 
ALABAMA 68,708(40.0%)
102,989 
(60.0%) -
2
(>0.1%) 10 
ARKANSAS 38,649(39.9%)
58,086 
(59.9%)
211
(0.2%) - 6
CALIFORNIA 79,258 (50.9%)
76,460
(49.1%)
47
(>0.1%)
19
(>0.1%) 6
COLORADO Hayes 3
CONNECTICUT 59,033(48.3%)
61,927 
(50.7%)
774
(0.6%)
400
(0.3%) 6
DELEWARE 10,752(44.6%)
13,381 
(55.5%) - - 3
FLORIDA 23,849 (51.0%)
22,927
(49.0%) - - 4
GEORGIA 50,533(28.0%)
130,157 
(72.0%) - - 11 
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ILLINOIS 278,232 (50.2%)
258,611
(46.7%)
17,207
(3.1%)
318
(0.1%) 21 
INDIANA 208,011(48.3%)
213,529 
(49.5%)
9,533
(2.2%) - 15 
IOWA 171,326 (58.4%)
112,121
(38.2%)
9,431
(3.2%)
520
(0.2%) 11 
KANSAS 78,324 (63.1%)
37,902
(30.5%)
7,770
(6.3%)
138
(0.1%) 5
KENTUCKY 97,568(37.4%)
160,060 
(61.4%) -
2,998
(1.2%) 12 
LOUISIANA 75,315 (51.7%)
70,508
(48.4%) - - 8
MAINE 66,300 (56.6%)
49,917
(42.7%) -
828
(0.7%) 7
MARYLAND 71,980(44.0%)
91,779 
(56.1%) - - 8
MASSACHUSETTS 150,063 (57.8%)
108,777
(41.9%) -
779
(0.3%) 13 
MICHIGAN 166,901 (52.4%)
141,665
(44.5%)
9,023
(2.8%)
837
(0.3%) 11 
MINNESOTA 72,962 (58.8%)
48,799
(39.3%)
2,399
(1.9%) - 5
MISSISSIPPI 52,603(31.9%)
112,173 
(68.1%) - - 8
MISSOURI 145,027(41.4%)
202,086 
(57.6%)
3,497
(1.0%) - 15 
NEBRASKA 31,915 (64.8%)
17,343
(35.2%) - - 3
NEVADA 10,383 (52.7%)
9,308
(47.3%) - - 3
NEW HAMPSHIRE 41,540 (51.8%)
38,510
(48.1%) -
93
(0.1%) 5
NEW JERSEY 103,517(47.0%)
115,962 
(52.7%)
714
(0.3%) - 9
NEW YORK 489,207(48.2%)
521,949 
(51.4%)
1,978
(0.2%)
2,369
(0.2%) 35 
NORTH CAROLINA 108,484(46.4%)
125,427 
(53.6%) - - 10 
OHIO 330,698 (50.2%)
323,182
(49.1%)
3,058
(0.5%)
1,712
(0.3%) 22 
OREGON 15,207 (50.9%)
14,157
(47.4%)
509
(1.7%) - 3
PENNSYLVANIA 384,157 (50.6%)
366,204
(48.3%)
7,209
(1.0%)
1,403
(0.2%) 29 
RHODE ISLAND 15,787 (59.6%)
10,712
(40.4%) - - 4
SOUTH CAROLINA 91,786 (50.2%)
90,897
(49.8%) - - 7
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TENNESSEE 89,566(40.2%)
133,177 
(59.8%) - - 12 
TEXAS 45,013(29.7%)
106,372 
(70.2%) -
46
(>0.1%) 8
VERMONT 44,092 (68.4%)
20,254
(31.4%) -
114
(0.2%) 5
VIRGINIA 95,518(40.4%)
140,770 
(59.6%) - - 11 
WEST VIRGINIA 41,997(42.2%)
56,546 
(56.8%)
1,104
(1.1%) - 5
WISCONSIN 130,050 (50.6%)
123,922
(48.2%)
1,509
(0.6%)
1,695
(0.7%) 10 
TOTALS 4,034,311(48.0%)
4,288,546 
(51.0%)
75,973
(0.9%)
14,271
(0.2%) .
ELECTORAL 
VOTES 185 184 0 0
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Appendix 2: Electoral Map of 2000 and Summary
From: 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/onpolitics/elections/2000/results/whitehouse/
State-by-State Electoral Votes
No Winner Declared Democrat Republican Other
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Presidential Election of 2000, Electoral and Popular Vote 
Summary
From:  http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0876793.html
Principal Candidates for President and Vice President:
Republican—George W. Bush; Richard B. Cheney (winner)
Democratic—Albert A. Gore, Jr.; Joseph I. Lieberman
Green—Ralph Nader; Winona LaDuke
George W. 
Bush 
Albert A. 
Gore, Jr.
Ralph
Nader Electoral votes
Popular
vote % 
Popular
vote % 
Popular
vote % R D G
Alabama 941,173 56% 692,611 42% 18,323 1% 9
Alaska 167,398 59 79,004 28 28,747 10 3
Arizona 781,652 51 685,341 45 45,645 3 8
Arkansas 472,940 51 422,768 46 13,421 1 6
California 4,567,429 42 5,861,203 53 418,707 4 54
Colorado 883,748 51 738,227 42 91,434 5 8
Connecticut 561,094 38 816,015 56 64,452 4 8
Delaware 137,288 42 180,068 55 8,307 3 3
DC 18,073 9 171,923 85 10,576 5 21
Florida 2,912,790 49 2,912,253 49 97,488 2 25
Georgia 1,419,720 55 1,116,230 43 13,4322 1 13
Hawaii 137,845 37 205,286 56 21,623 6 4
Idaho 336,937 67 138,637 28 12,2922 2 4
Illinois 2,019,421 43 2,589,026 55 103,759 2 22
Indiana 1,245,836 57 901,980 41 18,5312 1 12
Iowa 634,373 48 638,517 49 29,374 2 7
Kansas 622,332 58 399,276 37 36,086 3 6
Kentucky 872,492 57 638,898 41 23,192 2 8
Louisiana 927,871 53 792,344 45 20,473 1 9
Maine 286,616 44 319,951 49 37,127 6 4
Maryland 813,797 40 1,145,782 56 53,768 3 10
Massachusetts 878,502 33 1,616,487 60 173,564 6 12
Michigan 1,953,139 46 2,170,418 51 84,165 2 18
Minnesota 1,109,659 46 1,168,266 48 126,696 5 10
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Mississippi 572,844 58 404,614 41 8,122 1 7
Missouri 1,189,924 50 1,111,138 47 38,515 2 11
Montana 240,178 58 137,126 33 24,437 6 3
Nebraska 433,862 62 231,780 33 24,540 4 5
Nevada 301,575 50 279,978 46 15,008 2 4
New Hampshire 273,559 48 266,348 47 22,198 4 4
New Jersey 1,284,173 40 1,788,850 56 94,554 3 15
New Mexico 286,417 48 286,783 48 21,251 4 5
New York 2,403,374 35 4,107,697 60 244,030 4 33
North Carolina 1,631,163 56 1,257,692 43 — — 14
North Dakota 174,852 61 95,284 33 9,486 3 3
Ohio 2,351,209 50 2,186,190 46 117,857 3 21
Oklahoma 744,337 60 474,276 38 — — 8
Oregon 713,577 47 720,342 47 77,357 5 7
Pennsylvania 2,281,127 46 2,485,967 51 103,392 2 23
Rhode Island 130,555 32 249,508 61 25,052 6 4
South Carolina 785,937 57 565,561 41 20,200 1 8
South Dakota 190,700 60 118,804 38 — — 3
Tennessee 1,061,949 51 981,720 47 19,781 1 11
Texas 3,799,639 59 2,433,746 38 137,994 2 32
Utah 515,096 67 203,053 26 35,850 5 5
Vermont 119,775 41 149,022 51 20,374 7 3
Virginia 1,437,490 52 1,217,290 44 59,398 2 13
Washington 1,108,864 45 1,247,652 50 103,002 4 11
West Virginia 336,475 52 295,497 46 10,680 2 5
Wisconsin 1,237,279 48 1,242,987 48 94,070 4 11
Wyoming 147,947 68 60,481 28 4,6252 2 3
Total 50,456,002 47.87% 50,999,897 48.38% 2,882,955 2.74% 271 266
NOTE: Total electoral votes = 538. Total electoral votes needed to win = 270. Dash (—) indicates not on ballot.
Percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding and other candidates.
1. The District of Columbia has 3 votes. There was 1 abstention.
2. Write-in votes.
Source: Federal Election Commission.
Voting age population (Census Bureau Population Survey for Nov. 2000): 205,815,000
Percentage of voting age population casting a vote for president: 51.3%
